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SUPERVISED RELEASE IS NOT PAROLE 
Jacob Schuman* 
          The United States has the largest prison population in the 
developed world. Yet outside prisons, there are almost twice as many 
people serving terms of criminal supervision in the community—
probation, parole, and supervised release. At the federal level, this “mass 
supervision” of convicted offenders began with the Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984, which abolished parole and created a harsher and more 
expansive system called supervised release. Last term in United States v. 
Haymond, the Supreme Court took a small step against mass supervision 
by striking down one provision of the supervised release statute as 
violating the right to a jury trial. But the Justices did not consider all the 
differences between parole and supervised release, which have far 
broader consequences for the constitutional law of community 
supervision. 
          The current consensus among the courts of appeals is that 
supervised release is “constitutionally indistinguishable” from parole 
and therefore governed by the same minimal standard of due process. 
Closer inspection, however, reveals three significant differences between 
parole and supervised release. First, parole was a relief from 
punishment, while supervised release is an additional penalty. Second, 
parole revocation was rehabilitative, while supervised release 
revocation is punitive. Finally, parole was run by an agency, while 
supervised release is controlled by courts. Because of these differences, 
revocation of supervised release should be governed by a higher 
standard of due process than revocation of parole. In particular, 
defendants on supervised release deserve more protection against 
delayed revocation hearings, which may deny them the opportunity to 
seek concurrent sentencing. 
  
 
 * Research and Writing Attorney, Appellate Unit, Federal Community Defender Office for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; Harvard Law School, J.D.; Brown University, B.A. Thank 
you to Professors Douglas Berman, Daniel Hemel, and Carol Steiker for their helpful comments 
and support. Thanks as well to the editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. All views and 
errors are my own. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States has the largest prison population in the 
developed world: 2.3 million people behind bars.1 Yet outside prison 
walls, there are almost twice as many people, 4.5 million, serving 
terms of criminal supervision in the community—probation, parole, 
and supervised release.2 This “mass supervision” of convicted 
defendants is, as the District Attorney of Philadelphia Larry Krasner 
recently said, “a major driver of mass incarceration.”3 Currently, 
almost 300,000 people are incarcerated for violating conditions of 
their supervision—one third of all prisoners in thirteen states, and 
more than half of all prisoners in Arkansas, Idaho, Missouri, and 
Wisconsin.4 Proceedings to revoke community supervision are 
governed by only a minimum standard of due process, with no right to 
a jury and no right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.5 
Mass supervision at the federal level began with the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984, which abolished the old parole regime and 
created a harsher and more expansive system called “supervised 
release.” Today, over 100,000 people are serving terms of supervised 
release—five times more than were under parole—and over 10,000 
people are in federal prison for violating the conditions of their 
release.6 Last term in United States v. Haymond,7 the Supreme Court 
took a small step against mass supervision by striking down one 
provision of the supervised release statute as violating the defendant’s 
 
 1. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON POL’Y 
INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html. 
 2. DANIELLE KAEBLE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
NCJ251148, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2016 1 (Apr. 2018),  
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus16.pdf. 
 3. Press Release, Phila. Dist. Attorney’s Office, New Philadelphia D.A.O. Policies 
Announced March 21, 2019 to End Mass Supervision (Mar. 21, 2019) 
https://medium.com/philadelphia-justice/philadelphia-daos-policies-to-end-mass-supervision-
fd5988cfe1f1. 
 4. Alan Greenblatt, Probation and Parole Violations Are Filling up Prisons and Costing 
States Billions, GOVERNING (June 18, 2019, 6:11 PM), https://www.governing.com/topics/public-
justice-safety/gov-parole-probation-report-criminal-justice.html. 
 5. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., NUMBER OF OFFENDERS ON FEDERAL SUPERVISED RELEASE 
HITS ALL-TIME HIGH (Jan. 2017), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2017/01/number_of_
offenders_on_federal_supervised_release_hits_alltime_high.pdf. 
 6. Jacob Schuman, America’s Shadow Criminal Justice System, NEW REPUBLIC, 
(May 30, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/148592/americas-shadow-criminal-justice-
system. 
 7.   139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019). 
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right to a jury trial.8 But the Justices did not consider all the differences 
between parole and supervised release, which have far broader 
consequences for the constitutional law of community supervision.9 
Until Haymond, supervised release had received scant attention 
from either scholars or courts.10 During the 1970s, the Supreme Court 
issued three major decisions on the constitutional rights of parolees, 
holding that parole revocation was governed by a minimal standard of 
due process with no other protections under the Bill of Rights.11 Yet 
after Congress created supervised release in 1984, the Court spent 
more than thirty years in silence as to how this new system fit into the 
nation’s constitutional framework. Meanwhile, a consensus arose 
among the courts of appeals that supervised release was simply a 
continuation of the old parole system and therefore governed by the 
old parole precedents. Declaring that parole and supervised release 
revocations were “constitutionally indistinguishable and . . . analyzed 
in the same manner,”12 the circuit courts held that defendants facing 
revocation of supervised release were entitled to the same bare 
minimum standard of due process as parolees: a hearing before a judge 
(but not a jury), with a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of 
proof (rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt), no Fourth 
Amendment rights, no right against self-incrimination, no right to a 
 
 8. Id. at 2378–79. 
 9. Id. at 2380. 
 10. Fiona Doherty and Christine S. Scott-Hayward are the only legal scholars to have 
published extensive analyses of supervised release, and this Article is indebted to their work. See 
Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of Supervised Release, 88 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 958, 960 (2013); Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Shadow Sentencing: The Imposition of 
Federal Supervised Release, 18 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 180, 182–83 (2013). The Federal Sentencing 
Reporter also dedicated a helpful 1994 issue to the subject. See David N. Adair, Revocation of 
Supervised Release—A Judicial Function, 6 FED. SENT’G. REP. 190 (1994); Paula Kei Biderman & 
Jon M. Sands, A Prescribed Failure: The Lost Potential of Supervised Release, 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 
204 (1994); Sharon O. Henegan, Revocation of Probation and Supervised Release: A Commission 
Perspective, 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 199 (1994); Carlos Juenke, Using Internal Intermediate Sanctions 
to Avoid Revocation of Supervised Release for Cocaine Use, 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 210 (1994); 
George P. Kazen, Mandatory Revocation for Drug Use: A Plea for Reconsideration, 6 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 202 (1994); Keith A. Koenning, Supervised Release Violators and the Comprehensive 
Sanctions Center in the Northern District of Ohio, 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 208 (1994); Michael A. 
Stover, The Future of Supervised Release, 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 195 (1994); Barbara M. Vincent, 
Supervised Release: Looking for a Place in a Determinate Sentencing System, 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 
187 (1994); Thomas N. Whiteside, The New Challenge of Supervised Release, 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 
211 (1994). 
 11. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).  
 12. United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 985 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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speedy trial, no Confrontation Clause right, no right to effective 
assistance of counsel, and no rights under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.13 
Haymond is the Supreme Court’s first major decision on the 
constitutional law of supervised release. Spotlighting the important 
role of community supervision in the federal criminal justice system, 
the case also left the Court intractably divided. In a splintered 4–1–4 
vote, five Justices agreed to strike down one provision of the 
supervised release statute that imposed a five-year mandatory 
minimum sentence on sex offenders who violated their release by 
committing another sex offense. But unable to settle on a majority 
opinion, the Justices split over how best to understand the relationship 
between parole and supervised release. 
Justice Gorsuch wrote a plurality opinion, emphasizing “[a]ll that 
changed beginning in 1984” when “Congress overhauled federal 
sentencing procedures to make prison terms more determinate and 
abolish the practice of parole.”14 While parole supervision replaced 
prison time, he explained, supervised release is imposed “to encourage 
rehabilitation after the completion” of a full prison sentence.15 This 
difference “bears constitutional consequences,” because under 
Apprendi v. New Jersey,16 any fact increasing a sentencing range must 
be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.17 Parole revocation 
complied with this rule because it “generally exposed a defendant only 
to the remaining prison term authorized for his crime of conviction,” 
but the five-year mandatory minimum violated it by “expos[ing] a 
 
 13. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(2)(A) (procedure for revocation hearing before judge); see 
also Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000) (preponderance of the evidence standard 
of proof) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)); United States v. Hulen, 879 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 
2018) (no right against self-incrimination); United States v. Santana, 526 F.3d 1257, 1260–62 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (no speedy trial); United States v. Rondeau, 430 F.3d 44, 47–48 (1st Cir. 2005) (no 
Confrontation Clause); United States v. Armstrong, 187 F.3d 392, 393–94 (4th Cir. 1999) (no 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule); United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110, 113–14 (11th Cir. 
1994) (no Federal Rules of Evidence); United States v. Allgood, 48 F. Supp. 2d 554, 559 (E.D. Va. 
1999) (no effective assistance of counsel). Even the few favorable decisions for defendants on 
supervised release compared the system to parole. See, e.g., United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 
1122–23 (2d Cir. 1994) (retroactive application of mandatory-minimum revocation sentence 
violated Ex Post Facto Clause). 
 14. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2382. 
 15. Id. 
 16.  530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 17. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2381–82. 
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defendant to an additional . . . prison term well beyond that authorized 
by the jury’s verdict.”18 
Justice Breyer wrote a concurrence for himself only, agreeing that 
the five-year mandatory minimum was unconstitutional because it was 
too trial-like, but not applying Apprendi because of “the potentially 
destabilizing consequences.”19 He stressed that the mandatory 
minimum was an unusually punitive outlier from the rest of the 
supervised release system, which he said was otherwise similar to 
parole.20 
Finally, Justice Alito wrote a very frustrated dissent calling the 
plurality opinion “revolutionary” and even “dangerous” for casting 
doubt on supervised release.21 He argued that there was no Apprendi 
problem because the original jury verdict itself authorized the judge to 
impose the five-year mandatory minimum, and called the plurality’s 
distinction between parole and supervised release “purely formal” 
with “no constitutional consequences.”22 
The majority vote in Haymond is an important reaffirmance of the 
right to a jury trial in an age of mass supervision. It is also the Court’s 
first official recognition of one significant difference between parole 
and supervised release: parole replaced prison time, while supervised 
release adds to it. Nevertheless, the opinions are limited in focus. The 
Justices solely considered the jury trial right, without addressing the 
broader due process analysis. The Justices also appeared to agree that 
parole was otherwise similar to supervised release, with the plurality 
and dissent describing them as rehabilitative and Justice Breyer stating 
that the role of the judge was the same in each system.23 
Although Haymond represents a step forward in understanding 
the constitutional relationship between parole and supervised release, 
the Court’s analysis was incomplete. Closer inspection actually 
reveals three critical differences between the systems: 
 
 18. Id. at 2382. 
 19. Id. at 2385–86 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 2386, 2399 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 22. Id. at 2388. 
 23. See also id. at 2385 (Breyer, J., concurring) (role of judge same under supervised release 
and parole). Compare id. at 2382 (plurality opinion) (supervised release and parole both 
rehabilitative), with id. at 2389 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that supervised release and parole 
were both intended to provide a period of reform so that a prisoner could return to society and lead 
a law-abiding life). 
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• Parole was a relief from punishment, while supervised 
release is an additional penalty. 
• Parole revocation was rehabilitative, while supervised 
release revocation is punitive. 
• Parole was run by an agency, while supervised release is 
controlled by courts. 
Because of these differences, the Supreme Court’s parole 
revocation precedents should not apply to supervised release. Instead, 
defendants on supervised release deserve more procedural protections 
before their release is revoked. Treating supervised release like parole 
can result in significant unfair prejudice to criminal defendants, 
especially when they challenge delayed hearings to revoke release. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II recounts the history of 
parole and supervised release. Part III reviews the caselaw. Part IV 
shows how parole and supervised release differ in three significant 
respects and explains why those differences matter for the 
constitutional law of community supervision. Finally, Part V applies 
this analysis to the right to a timely revocation hearing, showing how 
applying parole precedents to supervised release unfairly denies 
criminal defendants the opportunity to seek concurrent sentences. 
II.  THE HISTORY OF PAROLE AND SUPERVISED RELEASE 
The origins of mass supervision predate the modern prison itself. 
Beginning in the Australian penal colony in the eighteenth century, 
humanitarian reformers advocated rehabilitating criminal offenders by 
promising them early relief from punishment. This practice eventually 
won support in the United States, where it became known as “parole,” 
an essential feature of American criminal justice. In the 1960s and 
1970s, however, Americans lost faith in the rehabilitative theory of 
punishment, leading Congress to enact the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984, which abolished parole and created supervised release. 
Supervised release was initially intended to be limited and 
rehabilitative, but a series of amendments over the next two decades 
transformed it into a harsher and more expansive system. 
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A.  Origins of Early Release 
The history of parole begins in 1787, with the British penal colony 
in Australia.24 At the time, criminal conduct was punished with fines, 
torture, or death, while prisons served merely to hold defendants 
pending trial.25 But as the crime rate rose at the end of the eighteenth 
century and “[w]holesale hangings” of criminal offenders grew 
unpopular, British courts began offering the choice of an alternative 
punishment—exile in a foreign colony, also known as 
“transportation.”26 
Over the next eighty years, Britain transported over 150,000 
convicts to its penal colony in Australia, where a colonial Board of 
Assignment “leased” them to newly arriving settlers.27 The convicts 
worked without compensation, while the settlers paid the government 
“to cover the cost of their maintenance.”28 If a convict “behaved well” 
for four, six, or eight years (depending on the length of his sentence), 
then he could earn a “ticket of leave” that would excuse him from 
further labor.29 But even those convicts who received tickets were 
subject to strict rules and denied basic civil rights, including the right 
to own property.30 
Eventually, this exploitative system prompted calls for reform, 
planting the seeds of an idea that would one day grow into parole. In 
1836, the London Society for the Improvement of Prison Discipline 
persuaded the British government to send a colonial official from 
Tasmania, Alexander Maconochie, to investigate the mistreatment of 
Australian convicts.31 Maconochie published a searing critique of the 
 
 24. See Helen Leland Witmer, The History, Theory and Results of Parole, 18 J. AM. INST. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 24, 26 (1927). 
 25. See id. at 24–25. 
 26. Id. at 25; see also Edward Lindsey, Historical Sketch of the Indeterminate Sentence and 
Parole System, 16 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 9, 11 (1925). 
 27. See Witmer, supra note 24, at 25–26; Lindsey, supra note 26, at 11. Convict leasing was 
justified on the ground that the government had paid to transport the convicts to Australia. See 
Doherty, supra note 10, at 965. The practice appears to be an outgrowth of British courts paying 
private contractors to transport convicts to North America with “a property right in the services of 
the felons.” Witmer, supra note 24, at 24. 
 28. Doherty, supra note 10, at 965. 
 29. Id. (quoting William Molesworth, Sir, SELECT COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION xvii 
(1837–38)). 
 30. ALEXANDER MACONOCHIE, AUSTRALIANA: THOUGHTS ON CONVICT MANAGEMENT 
AND OTHER SUBJECTS CONNECTED WITH THE AUSTRALIAN PENAL COLONIES 3–4 (London, John 
W. Parker, West Strand 1839). 
 31. Doherty, supra note 10, at 966. 
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colony, condemning what he saw as a “disguised system of slavery.”32 
Convicts lived in the “roughest manner,” he reported, “subject to the 
most severe regulations” and “equally severe punishments,” including 
“the chain-gang or the triangle, or . . . hard labor on the roads.”33 
Tickets of leave promised eventual relief, but they were difficult to 
earn, because “[t]he record kept of prisoners’ conduct only embraces 
offences,” not “good ordinary behaviour.”34 Tickets also could be 
revoked for “trifling irregularities” and “on very slight occasion,” so a 
“very large proportion” of ticket holders were eventually forced back 
into labor.35 
Maconochie proposed that the penal colony’s fundamental flaw 
was its lack of concern for the convicts’ wellbeing and development. 
“The essential and obvious error,” he declared, was the “total neglect 
of moral reasoning and influence, and [the] exclusive reliance, in 
every relation of life, on mere physical coercion.”36 As a result, “[t]he 
prisoners are all made bad men instead of good.”37 Instead, he 
suggested, penal officials should encourage their captives’ moral 
reform. According to him, convicts should not be sentenced to a term 
of years, but instead required to earn “a fixed number of marks of 
commendation” in order to win release.38 Convicts would be awarded 
“marks” for good behavior and lose them for bad, with the rules of the 
colony enforced “merely by the gain, or loss, of marks.”39 By 
collecting more and more marks, a convict would earn “successive 
degrees” of freedom, eventually leading to total release.40 Under this 
system, Maconochie predicted, criminals would be motivated to better 
themselves: “[W]hen a man keeps the key of his own prison, he is soon 
persuaded to fit it to the lock.”41 
 
 32. MACONOCHIE, supra note 30, at 37. 
 33. Id. at 2. 
 34. Id. at 3. 
 35. Id. at 4. 
 36. Id. at 7–8. 
 37. Id. at 11. 
 38. Id. at 21. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Lindsey, supra note 26, at 23; see also MACONOCHIE, supra note 30, at 21 (“I am 
convinced that the Social decorums, virtues, and feelings, which would be thus early and 
universally elicited, would have the most powerful effect in changing the characters of many, even 
of the very hardened.”). 
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Maconochie’s proposal became known as the “mark system,”42 
one principle of a broader penal reform movement that advocated for 
a more humane approach to criminal justice by rehabilitating 
offenders, rather than inflicting suffering.43 In the 1850s, Australia 
won limited self-government and began refusing to accept more 
convicts, leading the British to turn to prisons as a primary method of 
punishing criminal defendants.44 At last forced to reckon with how to 
administer a large and growing population of domestic prisoners, 
prison officials in both England and Ireland drew on Maconochie’s 
ideas, experimenting with “progressive stages of confinement” that 
rewarded good behavior by advancing inmates from solitary 
imprisonment, to communal labor, and finally to freedom.45 
Like Maconochie’s mark system, these new programs reflected a 
rehabilitative mindset.46 Walter Crofton, chair of the Board of 
Directors of Convict Prisons for Ireland, claimed his “system of 
measuring the industry and improvement of the criminal, and crediting 
him with an intelligible value for it” made each prisoner “the arbiter 
of his own fate, and . . . induced to co-operate with those placed over 
him in their efforts for his improvement.”47 Joshua Jebb, chair of the 
English Board, described his “principle of graduation” in similar 
terms: “Whilst advocating a stringent and repressive system of 
 
 42. Doherty, supra note 10, at 967. Maconochie was not the only one to advocate for early 
release as a means of rehabilitating criminal offenders. A French reformer proposed a similar idea 
in 1838: “Since the principal aim of the penalty is the reform of the convict, it is desirable that any 
convict whose moral regeneration is sufficiently assured should be set free.” MICHEL FOUCAULT, 
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 269 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books ed., 
1979) (1977). 
 43. See Jacob Schuman, Sentencing Rules and Standards: How We Decide Criminal 
Punishment, 83 TENN. L. REV. 1, 8–9 n.28 (2015). The National Prison Association declared in 
1870: “The treatment of criminals by society is for the protection of society. But since such 
treatment is directed to the criminal rather than to the crime, its great object should be his moral 
regeneration. Hence the supreme aim of prison discipline is the reformation of criminals, not the 
infliction of vindictive suffering.” Id. 
 44. Witmer, supra note 24, at 30–31, 34–36. 
 45. Doherty, supra note 10, at 970–75; Witmer, supra note 24, at 39. 
 46. While similar, the Irish and English mark systems differed in important respects, including 
that release was revocable in the Irish system, but not in the English. See Doherty, supra note 10, 
at 973–76; Witmer, supra note 24, at 39–40. 
 47. Walter Crofton, The Irish System of Prison Discipline, in TRANSACTIONS OF THE 
NATIONAL CONGRESS ON PENITENTIARY AND REFORMATORY DISCIPLINE 67 (E.C. Wines ed., 
Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1871). 
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discipline . . . I am no less impressed with the advantage of 
encouraging good conduct by the hope of reward.”48 
B.  Development of Parole 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, the mark system 
won converts across the Atlantic and took root in the United States. In 
the 1860s, the New York Prison Association began promoting the 
work of Maconochie, Crofton, and Jebb, declaring that prison should 
serve “as an adult reformatory, where the object is to teach and train 
the prisoner in such a manner that, on his discharge, he may be able to 
resist temptation and inclined to lead an upright, worthy life.”49 Early 
release for good behavior was key to achieving this goal, because it 
“plac[ed] the prisoner’s fate . . . in his own hands by enabling him, 
through industry and good conduct, to raise himself, step by step, to a 
position of less restraint; while idleness and bad conduct, on the other 
hand, keep him in a state of coercion and restraint.”50 
 In 1876, the New York legislature agreed to implement these 
ideas at a new prison in Elmira.51 At the Elmira Reformatory, prisoners 
would be sentenced to a fixed term of years, but the board of managers 
would also have the “power to establish rules and regulations under 
which prisoners . . . may be allowed to go upon parole outside of the 
reformatory buildings and inclosure [sic].”52 Eligibility for “parole” 
(derived from the French for “word of honor”53) would be based on “a 
system of marks,” which would be “credited for good personal 
demeanor, diligence in labor and study and for results accomplished” 
and “charged for derelictions, negligences and offenses.”54 The board 
 
 48. Joshua Jebb, Prison Discipline, in TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR 
THE PROMOTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 434 (George W. Hastings ed., London, John W. Parker, Son, 
and Bourne, West Strand, 1863). 
 49. Lindsey, supra note 26, at 17 (quoting F.H. WINES, PRISON REFORM, CHARITIES 
PUBLICATION COMMITTEE 26 (1910)); see also Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the 
United States, 26 CRIME & JUST. 479, 488 (1999). 
 50. Lindsey, supra note 26, at 17 (quoting F.H. WINES, PRISON REFORM, CHARITIES 
PUBLICATION COMMITTEE 26 (1910)); see also Charlton T. Lewis, The Indeterminate Sentence, 9 
YALE L.J. 17, 19 (1899) (“Let society hold its enemy in duress until he ceases to be its enemy. This 
rule protects the community and furnishes to the criminal the motive for adjusting himself to its 
order.”). 
 51. Lindsey, supra note 26, at 17, 21. 
 52. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF MANAGERS OF THE N.Y. STATE REFORMATORY AT 
ELMIRA, N.Y. FOR THE YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1888 54 (1889) [hereinafter ANNUAL 
REPORT]. 
 53. Doherty, supra note 10, at 981 n.139. 
 54. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 52, at 55–56. 
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of managers would also enjoy “full power” to “retake and reimprison 
any convict” who violated the “rules and regulations” governing his 
release.55 
Zebulon Brockway, superintendent of Elmira, advocated this 
system as a way to encourage prisoners to rehabilitate themselves: 
Captivity, always irksome, is now unceasingly so 
because . . . the duty and responsibility of shortening it and 
of modifying any undesirable present condition of it devolve 
upon the prisoner himself . . . . Naturally, these 
circumstances serve to arouse and rivet the attention upon the 
many matters of the daily conduct which so affect the rate of 
progress toward the coveted release. . . . Habitual careful 
attention with accompanying expectancy and appropriate 
exertion and resultant clarified vision constitute a habitus not 
consistent with criminal tendencies.56 
Brockway was apparently good on his word—nine out of ten inmates 
at Elmira earned early release from prison within their first three 
years.57 
The experiment at Elmira quickly won converts across the 
country.58 Between 1875 and 1900, twenty states passed laws allowing 
prisoners to earn early release for good behavior; by 1927, the number 
was forty-seven; and by the 1950s, every state in the nation had 
embraced parole.59 The federal government enacted its own Parole Act 
in 1910,60 creating a separate parole board for each federal prison, later 
consolidated in a single United States Parole Commission in 
Washington, D.C., with members appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate.61 
Under the federal parole system, sentencing worked as follows: 
A district judge would sentence a defendant to a fixed term of years of 
 
 55. Id. at 54–55. 
 56. Lindsey, supra note 26, at 27–28. 
 57. Doherty, supra note 10, at 982. 
 58. Lindsey, supra note 26, at 30–32. 
 59. Doherty, supra note 10, at 982–83; Petersilia, supra note 49, at 489; Lindsey, supra note 
26, at 30–40. 
 60. Parole Act, ch. 387, § 1, 36 Stat. 819 (1910), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3742 (2006)). Before 
1910, federal prisoners received “good-time” credit for each month they obeyed prison rules, with 
no supervision after their release. Lindsey, supra note 26, at 56. 
 61. Peter B. Hoffman, History of the Federal Parole System: Part I (1910–1972), 61 FED. 
PROB. 23, 23 (1997). 
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imprisonment from within a range set by statute.62 After he had served 
one-third of that term, the Parole Commission could grant him early 
release from prison if he had “substantially observed the rules of the 
institution” and his return to the community would neither “depreciate 
the seriousness of his offense or promote disrespect for the law” nor 
“jeopardize the public welfare.”63 Upon release, the parolee would be 
subject to supervision by a parole officer, who would enforce 
“conditions of parole” set by the Commission.64 If the Commission 
found that the parolee had violated a condition, then it could revoke 
his parole and send him back to prison to serve out the remainder of 
his original sentence.65 Representative Henry D. Clayton of Alabama, 
who introduced the parole legislation in the House, declared it “in 
accordance with the enlightened sentiment of the day, the progressive 
spirit of the times, and in harmony with the philanthropy of the day 
and age, that would aid suffering humanity and at the same time lend 
a helping hand toward the reformation of convicted criminals.”66 
C.  Turn Against Indeterminate Sentencing 
By the 1970s, parole “ha[d] become an integral part of the 
[country’s] penological system.”67 At the system’s height, the Parole 
Commission granted early release to more than two-thirds of federal 
inmates,68 and parole boards across the country granted it in 
approximately three-fourths of all cases.69 Parole fit into a model of 
criminal punishment known as “indeterminate sentencing,” where the 
penalty for the crime was not fully determined in advance of its 
commission.70 Instead, Congress defined a statutory range for each 
offense, the judge selected a sentence from within that range for each 
 
 62. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (2012). 
 63. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4205(a) (2012), 4206(a) (2012) (repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3742 (2006)); 
see also Vincent, supra note 10, 187 n.1 (“Within these parameters, the United States Parole 
Commission selected the actual time of release by either setting a parole date or deciding that the 
inmate should be held until his or her mandatory release date.”). 
 64. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4209 (repealed 1987), 4214 (2012) (repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3742 (2006)). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Doherty, supra note 10, at 984–85. 
 67. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972). 
 68. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 30 (1979) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting in part). 
 69. Petersilia, supra note 49, at 489. 
 70. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989). 
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defendant, and the parole board determined when prisoners were ready 
to be released.71 
Yet, after one-hundred years of dominance, parole started to lose 
support. In the 1960s and 1970s, a bipartisan consensus emerged in 
favor of a more determinate approach to punishment.72 Critics on the 
left questioned the moral authority of parole boards to decide whether 
a person was ready to leave prison and criticized socio-economic 
disparities in who was granted parole.73 Critics on the right argued that 
criminal offenders deserved to be punished for their crimes, not 
released early or coddled with attempts at reform.74 Widely-read 
empirical studies suggested that prisons “have had no appreciable 
effect on recidivism,”75 leading many to doubt “that prison programs 
could ‘rehabilitate individuals on a routine basis’—or that parole 
officers could ‘determine accurately whether or when a particular 
prisoner ha[d] been rehabilitated.’”76 
Parole’s most influential critic was Judge Marvin Frankel of the 
Southern District of New York, who condemned indeterminate 
sentencing in his 1972 book, Criminal Sentences: Law Without 
Order.77 Judge Frankel described parole boards as capricious and 
secretive, and questioned their “supposed expertise” in predicting 
when any particular inmate was ready for release.78 He argued that the 
arbitrariness of the parole boards’ decisions encouraged prisoners to 
become cynical and manipulative: “The theory of rehabilitative 
benefit from the striving for parole is dissolved in an acid certainty 
among the supposed beneficiaries that the task is to find the muscle or 
the stratagems for beating a rotten system.”79 
 
 71. See id. at 364–65; Frank O. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and 
Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 679, 
680–84 (1996). 
 72. Schuman, supra note 43, at 11–12. 
 73. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365–66; Petersilia, supra note 49, at 492–93; see also KENNETH 
C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 11–12 (1969). 
 74. See Doherty, supra note 10, at 993–94; see also ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING 
CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION 182 (1975) (“It seems almost a 
truism that criminals should be punished so there will be less crime.”); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, 
DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 37 (Ne. Univ. Press ed., 1986) (1976). 
 75. Doherty, supra note 10, at 994; see also Schuman, supra note 43, at 11 (“Anecdotal and 
empirical evidence suggested that prisons were not reforming most offenders; meanwhile, crime 
rates were rising.”). 
 76. Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 324–25 (2011) (citation omitted). 
 77. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 90 (1973). 
 78. Id. at 90, 109. 
 79. Id. at 49. 
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Judge Frankel’s opposition to parole reflected his firm rejection 
of the rehabilitative theory of punishment.80 Sentencing policy in the 
mid-twentieth century was based on a “medical” model of 
imprisonment that echoed Maconochie’s call for the moral 
improvement of criminal offenders, viewing them as “sick” and 
needing “treatment” in prison.81 Parole boards were essential to this 
effort because they served “to administer indeterminate sentences by 
determining when the ‘patient’ was cured.”82 Judge Frankel ridiculed 
this idea: “We sentence many people every day who are not ‘sick’ in 
any identifiable respect, and are certainly not candidates for any form 
of therapy or ‘rehabilitation’ known thus far. . . . Instead, they have 
coldly and deliberately figured the odds, risked punishment for 
rewards large enough . . . to justify the risk, but then had the 
misfortune to be caught.”83 Therefore, he argued, “there should be no 
occasion for an indeterminate sentence,” since all legitimate 
sentencing considerations were “knowable on the day of 
sentencing.”84 “[T]he apparatus of parole and parole-board procedures 
needs drastic revision,” he declared, suggesting that all prisoners 
should serve “a definite sentence, known and justified on the day of 
sentencing.”85 
D.  End of Parole 
What followed in the late 1970s was “a true ‘sentencing 
revolution’ in which the highly-discretionary indeterminate 
sentencing systems that had been dominant for nearly a century” were 
“replaced by a diverse array of sentencing structures.”86 Despite this 
diversity, reformers were united in their goal of making sentences 
more determinate by abolishing parole and requiring defendants to 
serve their full prison terms.87 Legislation inspired by Judge Frankel’s 
 
 80. Id. at 90, 109. 
 81. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Criminal Sentencing in the United States: An Historical and 
Conceptual Overview, 423 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 117, 128 (1976); FRANKEL, 
supra note 77, at 89; see also Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 
388–89 (2006) (“The rehabilitative ideal was often conceived and discussed in medical terms . . . 
.”); MACONOCHIE, supra note 30, at 7–8 (discussing the need for moral reasoning and influence). 
 82. Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011, 1016 (1991). 
 83. FRANKEL, supra note 77, at 90, 109. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 98, 116. 
 86. Berman, supra note 81, at 395. 
 87. See id. 
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proposals failed at the federal level in 1975, but inspired states to begin 
eliminating their parole systems one by one.88 Maine went first in 
1976, followed by California and Indiana.89 By 1984, ten states had 
ended parole, and by the year 2000, every state in the country had 
enacted determinate sentencing reforms.90 
Congress abolished the federal parole system in the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984, which enacted “sweeping reforms” to the 
nation’s criminal justice system.91 The Act implemented Judge 
Frankel’s proposals by creating a determinate sentencing system in 
which defendants would serve their prison terms in full, with no 
opportunity for parole.92 The Act also expressly rejected the 
rehabilitative theory of imprisonment, instructing sentencing courts to 
“recogniz[e] that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of 
promoting correction and rehabilitation.”93 The Senate Report linked 
this rejection of rehabilitation to the abolition of parole: “[A]lmost 
everyone involved in the criminal justice system now doubts that 
rehabilitation can be induced reliably in a prison setting, and it is now 
quite certain that no one can really detect whether or when a prisoner 
is rehabilitated.”94 
Although the Sentencing Reform Act abolished parole, it still 
offered two extremely limited ways for prisoners to earn early 
release.95 First, every year a prisoner “displayed exemplary 
compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations,” he could 
receive thirty-six days of “good time” credit, or approximately 10 
percent off his sentence.96 Second, the Act instructed the Bureau of 
Prisons, “to the extent practicable,” to allow prisoners to “spend[] a 
 
 88. Doherty, supra note 10, at 995. 
 89. Petersilia, supra note 49, at 494–95. 
 90. See Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, Determinate Sentencing and Abolishing 
Parole: The Long-Term Impacts on Prisons and Crime, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 107, 108 (1996); 
Berman, supra note 81, at 394 n.41; Petersilia, supra note 49, at 495. 
 91. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989). 
 92. Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 228–30 (1993); Doherty, supra 
note 10, at 995. 
 93. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2012); see also Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 324–25 (2011) 
(“[T]he system’s attempt to ‘achieve rehabilitation of offenders had failed.’” (quoting Mistretta, 
488 U.S. at 366)); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 366–67. 
 94. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182. 
 95. Doherty, supra note 10, at 996; Stith & Koh, supra note 92, at 226, n.10. 
 96. Doherty, supra note 10, at 996; Stith & Koh, supra note 92, at 226, n.10. This figure was 
later increased to fifty-four days. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2012). 
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portion of the final months of [their] term (not to exceed 12 months), 
under conditions that will afford that prisoner a reasonable opportunity 
to adjust to and prepare for the reentry . . . into the community.”97 In 
practice, this meant prisoners would spend the last few months of their 
sentences in a halfway house or community correctional facility, with 
probation officers available to “offer assistance” during this time.98 
E.  Creation of Supervised Release 
To replace parole supervision after prison, the Sentencing Reform 
Act created a new kind of sentence called “supervised release.” Since 
the Parole Commission no longer had a role to play, the same judge 
who imposed the prison sentence was also assigned the power to 
choose a set of conditions that the defendant would have to obey for a 
term of years following his release.99 Supervised release would be 
imposed at the sentencing hearing, at the same time as the sentence of 
imprisonment. 
This change was intended to rationalize the imposition of post-
release supervision. Under parole, the length of the supervision term 
depended on “the time left on the original sentence,” rather than “the 
needs of the defendant.”100 As a result, parole terms were often lengthy 
and irrational. A well-behaved prisoner would be granted early release 
and then have to serve a long term of supervision in the community, 
while a poorly-behaved prisoner would not be granted release and so 
would have no supervision at all. Under supervised release, by 
contrast, judges would impose supervised release based on the 
individual facts of each case, so that “probation officers will only be 
supervising those releasees . . . who actually need supervision.”101 The 
legislative history gives as specific examples a defendant who will 
serve a very long prison sentence and need transitional support to 
return to the community, or a defendant with a special “need[]” for 
“supervision and training programs after release.102 
 
 97. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1) (2012). 
 98. Id. § 3624(c)(3). 
 99. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2016), invalidated by United States v. Haymond, 869 F.3d 1153 
(10th Cir. 2017); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A(2)(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2016). 
 100. Biderman & Sands, supra note 10, at 204. 
 101. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 125 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182. 
 102. Id. at 124. 
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Perhaps most significantly, the Sentencing Reform Act provided 
no mechanism to revoke a defendant’s supervised release.103 Neither 
judges nor probation officers would have the power to send defendants 
back to prison for violating their conditions of release, because 
Congress “did not believe that a minor violation of a condition of 
supervised release should result in resentencing of the defendant,” and 
“a more serious violation [c]ould be dealt with as a new offense.”104 
Only if a defendant repeatedly and flagrantly violated the conditions 
of his release could the government charge him with criminal 
contempt of court, but this would require a trial affording the 
defendant full constitutional protections.105 Supervised release would 
“provide rehabilitative services, but not in the guise of the coerced 
cure.”106 
Yet just two years after passing the Sentencing Reform Act, 
Congress enacted the first in a series of amendments that transformed 
supervised release into a harsher and more expansive system. The 
most significant change came in the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 
which added a revocation mechanism empowering judges to “revoke 
a term of supervised release” and sentence a defendant to 
imprisonment if the United States Attorney’s Office proved “by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition 
of supervised release.”107 Proceedings to revoke supervised release 
would be governed by the same rules as parole revocation, set forth in 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1.108 
Over the next two decades, Congress voted again and again to 
extend the reach of the supervised release system and enhance the 
penalties for violations. In addition to adding a revocation mechanism, 
the 1986 Act imposed mandatory minimum terms of supervised 
release on federal defendants convicted of drug-trafficking crimes.109 
In 1987, Congress voted to increase both the terms of supervised 
release and the prison sentences for violations.110 In 1994, Congress 
 
 103. See Biderman & Sands, supra note 10, at 204. 
 104. See id.; Harry B. Wooten, Violation of Supervised Release: Erosion of a Promising 
Congressional Idea into Troubled Policy and Practice, 6 FED. SENT’G. REP. 183, 183 (1994). 
 105. Doherty, supra note 10, at 999–1000. 
 106. Id. at 999. 
 107. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-7. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. at 3207-3–3207-5. 
 110. Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, §§ 8, 25, 101 Stat. 1266, 1267, 1272. 
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enacted a “mandatory revocation” provision, requiring judges to 
revoke release and impose a sentence of imprisonment if a defendant 
violated his release by possessing a controlled substance, possessing a 
firearm, or refusing a drug test.111 That same year, Congress also 
authorized judges to impose additional terms of supervised release as 
punishment when defendants violated their original terms of 
supervised release.112 In 2002, Congress expanded mandatory 
revocation by requiring judges to impose a sentence of imprisonment 
on defendants who failed three drug tests in a single year.113 Finally, 
in 2003, Congress increased the prison sentences for multiple 
supervised release violations and implemented lifetime supervised 
release and mandatory revocation for sex offenders.114 
The legislative history for these amendments is very thin,115 and 
what exists does not suggest a rehabilitative mission. The revocation 
mechanism was the result of lobbying by probation officials who 
sought greater leverage to enforce conditions of supervised release 
against defendants.116 The House Report accompanying the 2003 
amendment cited the views of “prosecutors regarding the inadequacy 
of the existing supervision periods for sex offenders . . . whose 
criminal conduct may reflect deep-seated aberrant sexual disorders 
that are not likely to disappear within a few years of release from 
prison.”117 
The Sentencing Commission also played a significant role in 
expanding and toughening supervised release.118 As the agency 
created by the Sentencing Reform Act to promulgate federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, the Commission’s very first edition in 1987 
directed that district courts “shall” impose a term of supervised release 
 
 111. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110505, 
108 Stat. 1796, 2016–17. 
 112. Id. at 2017. 
 113. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
273, § 2103, 116 Stat. 1758, 1793 (2002). 
 114. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act 
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 101, 117 Stat. 651, 652. 
 115. See Doherty, supra note 10, at 1001 (“[L]ittle consideration seems to have been given to 
the conceptual differences between supervised release and probation,” and “[t]he adoption of the 
revocation mechanism did not even warrant a separate header to draw attention to the change.”). 
 116. Id. at 1001–02; see also Vincent, supra note 10, at 188 (adding revocation mechanism 
because “without a realistic threat of reincarceration, some offenders would violate the conditions 
of supervised release with impunity”). 
 117. H.R. REP. NO. 108-66, at 49–50 (2003), as reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683. 
 118. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D3.1(a) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 1987). 
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whenever they sentence a defendant to more than one year in prison, 
and “may” impose supervised release “in any other case.”119 Every 
subsequent edition of the Guidelines has featured this same 
instruction, with the only exception being for defendants who are 
“deportable alien[s]” and thus “likely [to] be deported after 
imprisonment.”120 The Commission also adopted a highly punitive 
view of revocation, instructing that courts should aim to “sanction 
primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into account, to 
a limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and the 
criminal history of the violator.”121 
The cumulative effect of these changes has made supervised 
release into a more expansive, more rigid, and more punitive system. 
District judges now impose supervised release in 99 percent of eligible 
cases, with the average term lasting forty-one months (not counting 
those sentenced to lifetime supervised release).122 In 2015, the number 
of people on supervised release hit an all-time high of 115,000—five 
times more than were under parole.123 Revocations have also become 
more common,124 and more than half of all revocations are for non-
criminal conduct.125 One-third of all defendants are eventually found 
in violation of a condition of their release, with the average revocation 
sentence lasting eleven months.126 In 2009, over 10,000 people were 
in federal prison for violating their supervised release,127 which was 
between 5 and 10 percent of the total federal prison population.128 
While Congress intended supervised release to reduce government 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.1(c) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). 
Nonetheless, over 90 percent of non-citizen defendants are still sentenced to supervised release. 
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO SUPERVISED RELEASE 60 
(2010), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-
publications/2010/20100722_Supervised_Release.pdf. 
 121. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A3(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). 
 122. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 120, at 49–50. 
 123. See Schuman, supra note 6; PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 5. 
 124. See Whiteside, supra note 10, at 211 (“Approximately one-half of the districts report that 
there are more revocation actions than in the past . . . .”). 
 125. Doherty, supra note 10, at 1016. The Sentencing Guidelines suggest a long list of 
conditions of release. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2018). Judge Richard Posner counted ten “mandatory” conditions of release, fourteen 
“standard” conditions, and thirteen “special” or “additional” conditions. United States v. 
Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 372–73 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 126. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 120, at 63. 
 127. Id. at 69. 
 128. Statistics, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/population_ 
statistics.jsp (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
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interference in the lives of former prisoners, it instead has become a 
system of mass supervision. 
III.  CASELAW ON PAROLE AND SUPERVISED RELEASE 
Given the important role of supervised release in the federal 
criminal justice system, the constitutional law of community 
supervision has not received the attention it deserves. In the 1970s, the 
Supreme Court issued a series of three decisions defining the 
constitutional rights of parolees, affording them limited procedural 
protections before their release could be revoked.129 But after 
Congress abolished parole and created supervised release in 1984, the 
Court spent thirty years without addressing this new system. 
Meanwhile, the courts of appeals unanimously concluded that the two 
systems were not meaningfully different and therefore governed by 
the same minimal standard of due process. Last term in United States 
v. Haymond, the Supreme Court issued its first major decision on the 
constitutional law of supervised release, recognizing at least one 
important difference between the two systems, and striking down a 
provision of the supervised release statute as violating the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.130 
A.  Supreme Court’s Parole Decisions 
Parole has a long history in the United States, but the Supreme 
Court did not decide a major case on parole revocation until the 1970s, 
when it issued a series of three decisions defining the limited 
constitutional rights of parolees.131 Emphasizing the system’s 
administrative and rehabilitative nature, the Court held that parole 
revocation was governed by a minimal standard of process under the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, with no other protections 
under the Bill of Rights. 
 
 129. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 79 (1976); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790–
91 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487–89 (1972). 
 130. United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019). 
 131. A fourth decision, Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 
(1979), held that prisoners had “no constitutional or inherent right” to be granted parole and 
therefore no right to due process in such decisions. Id. at 7–8. Just like the parole revocation 
decisions, Greenholtz emphasized the system’s rehabilitative and administrative features, which 
“differ[ed] from the traditional mold of judicial decisionmaking in that the choice involve[d] a 
synthesis of record facts and personal observation filtered through the experience of the 
decisionmaker and leading to a predictive judgment as to what is best both for the individual inmate 
and for the community.” Id. at 8. 
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The Supreme Court’s first and most important decision on parole 
revocation was Morrissey v. Brewer132 in 1972, which held that 
parolees had a limited right to due process before their release could 
be revoked.133 Because “revocation of parole is not part of a criminal 
prosecution,” the Court explained, “the full panoply of rights due a 
defendant in such a proceeding does not apply.”134 
In excluding parole revocation from the Bill of Rights, the Court 
emphasized the unique “function of parole in the correctional 
process.”135 Parole was a grant of early release from prison “on the 
condition that the prisoner abide by certain rules during the balance of 
the sentence,” with a goal of “help[ing] individuals reintegrate into 
society as constructive individuals as soon as they are able.”136 Parole 
supervision was “not directly by the court but by an administrative 
agency.”137 These features of parole revocation differed 
fundamentally from criminal prosecution, and therefore the ordinary 
trial rights did not apply.138 
To determine the minimum procedural standards for parole 
revocation, the Court balanced the interests at stake.139 First, the 
“liberty of the parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the 
core values of unqualified liberty,” and therefore was “valuable and 
must be seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment,” 
requiring “some orderly process, however informal.”140 That liberty 
interest was diminished, however, because the parolee did not enjoy 
“the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled,” but only a 
“conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special 
parole restrictions.”141 For its part, the state had an “overwhelming 
interest in being able to return the individual to imprisonment without 
the burden of a new adversary criminal trial,” because it had found the 
parolee guilty of a crime, yet agreed to release him “with the 
recognition that with many prisoners there is a risk that they will not 
 
 132.  408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
 133. Id. at 480. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 477. 
 136. Id. The Court also noted that parole “serves to alleviate the costs to society of keeping an 
individual in prison.” Id. 
 137. Id. at 480. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 481–84. 
 140. Id. at 482. 
 141. Id. at 480. 
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be able to live in society without committing additional antisocial 
acts.”142 Finally, “[s]ociety has a stake in whatever may be the chance 
of restoring [the parolee] to normal and useful life within the law,” as 
well as “in treating the parolee with basic fairness: fair treatment in 
parole revocations will enhance the chance of rehabilitation.”143 
In light of this balancing analysis, the Court concluded that 
parolees had the right to a revocation hearing “within a reasonable 
time” after being “taken into custody,” where they should have “an 
opportunity to be heard,” to present evidence, and to argue against 
revocation.144 Although the Court would not “write a code of 
procedure” for these proceedings, it did set forth “the minimum 
requirements of due process”145 as follows: 
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) 
disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) 
opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses 
and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and 
cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer 
specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); 
(e) a “neutral and detached” hearing body such as a 
traditional parole board, members of which need not be 
judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the 
factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for 
revoking parole.146 
These rules were later formalized for federal parole and probation 
revocations in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1.147 
The Supreme Court’s second major decision on parole revocation 
came the next year in Gagnon v. Scarpelli,148 which held that parolees 
had no absolute right to appointed counsel, but rather should be 
 
 142. Id. at 483. 
 143. Id. at 484. 
 144. Id. at 488. 
 145. Id. at 488–89. 
 146. Id. 
 147. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1 (advisory committee’s note to 1979 addition); see also United States 
v. Tham, 884 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1989) (“In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S. 
Ct. 1756, 1759, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), the Supreme Court held that probationers were entitled to 
the due process rights provided to parolees, as outlined in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 
S. Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). These rights are codified in Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.”). 
 148. 411 U.S. 778 (1973). 
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assigned attorneys on a “case-by-case basis.”149 The opinion “dr[e]w 
heavily on the opinion in Morrissey,”150 and indeed adopted the same 
basic logic: because parole was rehabilitative and administrative, 
revocation was subject to a reduced standard of due process. 
The Court explained that parole’s primary purpose was “to help 
individuals reintegrate into society as constructive individuals as soon 
as they are able.”151 Parole officers, animated “by and large” with 
“concern for the client,” were “entrusted traditionally with broad 
discretion to judge the progress of rehabilitation in individual cases, 
and . . . armed with the power to recommend or even to declare 
revocation.”152 A revocation hearing was not like a “criminal trial,” 
because “the State is represented, not by a prosecutor, but by a parole 
officer.”153 Appointing counsel to the parolee would “alter 
significantly the nature of the proceeding,” since “the State in turn will 
normally provide its own counsel” and “lawyers, by training and 
disposition, are advocates and bound by professional duty to present 
all available evidence and arguments in support of their clients’ 
positions and to contest with vigor all adverse evidence and views.”154 
Ultimately, “[t]he role of the hearing body itself, aptly described in 
Morrissey as being ‘predictive and discretionary’” would become 
“more akin to that of a judge at a trial . . . less attuned to the 
rehabilitative needs of the individual probationer or parolee.”155 
Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that Morrissey promised 
limited procedural rights to parolees and that “the effectiveness of 
the[se] rights may in some circumstances depend on the use of skills” 
that “the probationer or parolee is unlikely to possess.”156 “In some 
cases,” the Court noted, “the probationer[] or parolee[] . . . can fairly 
be represented only by a trained advocate.”157 But because “due 
process is not so rigid as to require that . . . informality, flexibility, and 
economy must always be sacrificed,” the Court rejected “a new 
 
 149. Gagnon formally addressed probation, not parole, but the Court found no “difference 
relevant to the guarantee of due process between the revocation of parole and the revocation of 
probation.” Id. at 782, 790. 
 150. Id. at 783. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 784 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 477). 
 153. Id. at 789. 
 154. Id. at 787. 
 155. Id. at 787–88. 
 156. Id. at 786–87. 
 157. Id. at 788. 
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inflexible rule with respect to the requirement of counsel,” and instead 
concluded “that the decision as to the need for counsel must be made 
on a case-by-case basis in the exercise of a sound discretion by the 
state authority.”158 
The Supreme Court’s third and final decision on parole 
revocation came three years later in Moody v. Daggett,159 which 
addressed the right to a timely revocation hearing.160 The petitioner 
there was a federal prisoner convicted of rape on an Indian reservation 
and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment, for which he served four 
before being released on parole.161 He then shot and killed two people 
on the reservation, was convicted of homicide in federal court, and 
sentenced to another ten years’ imprisonment.162 Committing those 
homicides also obviously violated the conditions of his parole, so the 
Parole Commission issued “a parole violator warrant” against him, 
which it lodged with prison officials as a detainer.163 The petitioner 
then asked the Commission to “execute the warrant immediately so 
that any imprisonment imposed for violation of his earlier parole under 
the rape conviction could run concurrently with his . . . homicide 
sentences.”164 The Commission refused, saying that “it intended to 
execute the warrant only upon [his] release from his second 
sentence.”165 In response, the petitioner filed a federal habeas corpus 
action challenging the Commission’s refusal to execute the warrant. 
The Court affirmed the Commission’s decision, holding that a 
parolee was not “constitutionally entitled to a prompt parole 
revocation hearing when a parole violator warrant is issued and lodged 
with the institution of his confinement.”166 The Court acknowledged 
that under Morrissey, the parolee had the right to a revocation hearing 
“within a reasonable time after [he] is taken into custody.”167 But 
 
 158. Id. at 788, 790. The Court added that appointed counsel should be “[p]resumptively” 
required when the parolee made “a timely and colorable claim” that he had not committed the 
alleged violation or had “substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation or make 
revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or 
present.” Id. 
 159. 429 U.S. 78 (1976). 
 160. Id. (holding that issuance of parole violator warrant is not per se deprivation of rights). 
 161. Id. at 80. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 80–81. 
 165. Id. at 81. 
 166. Id. at 79. 
 167. Id. at 87 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972)). 
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because the petitioner was currently incarcerated for the homicide 
convictions, not the parole violation, the Court concluded that 
deferring the hearing did him no harm, and he had no right to object 
to the delay.168 
The Court specifically rejected the petitioner’s argument that 
delaying the revocation hearing would harm him by denying him the 
“opportunity” to serve his sentence for the parole violation 
concurrently with his sentence for the homicide convictions.169 Under 
the parole regulations, the Court noted, the Commission “ha[d] power 
to grant, retroactively, the equivalent or concurrent sentences and to 
provide for unconditional or conditional release upon completion of 
the subsequent sentence.”170 Therefore, “deferral of the revocation 
decision does not deprive petitioner of any such opportunity.”171 
“Finally,” the Court said, there was the “practical aspect to 
consider.”172 Because the petitioner had pled guilty to two homicides, 
he also had obviously violated the conditions of his parole, and “the 
only remaining inquiry is whether continued release is justified 
notwithstanding the violation.”173 Since this decision was “uniquely a 
‘prediction as to the ability of the individual to live in society without 
committing antisocial acts,’” his “institutional record” was “perhaps 
one of the most significant factors.”174 “Given the predictive nature of 
the hearing,” the Court concluded, it made sense to delay it until the 
petitioner finished his current sentence, at which point that 
“prediction” would be “both most relevant and most accurate.”175 
B.  Supreme Court’s Silence on Supervised Release 
In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act, abolishing 
parole and creating supervised release. Yet between 1984 and 2019, 
the Supreme Court said almost nothing about how this new system of 
post-release supervision fit into the nation’s constitutional framework. 
During this time, the Court issued only three minor opinions touching 
supervised release, all involving technical issues of statutory 
 
 168. Id. at 86. 
 169. Id. at 87. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 89. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)). 
 175. Id. 
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interpretation.176 The little the Court did say about supervised release 
suggested that it served the same rehabilitative function as parole and 
therefore should be analyzed in the same manner. 
The Court’s 1991 decision in Gozlon-Peretz v. United States177 
addressed how supervised release should apply to defendants who 
committed their offenses between 1986 (when Congress imposed 
mandatory minimum terms of supervised release for drug offenses) 
and 1987 (when the Sentencing Reform Act actually took effect).178 
Based on the statutory text, the Justices concluded that these interim 
offenders should be subject to the mandatory terms of supervised 
release.179 The decision turned entirely on a close reading of the 
statutes and said virtually nothing about supervised release, though it 
did note that in contrast to parole, “the sentencing court, rather than 
the Parole Commission, . . . oversee[s] the defendant’s post-
confinement monitoring.”180 The opinion also noted cryptically that 
“[s]upervised release is a unique method of post-confinement 
supervision invented by Congress for a series of sentencing 
reforms.”181 
In United States v. Johnson,182 decided in 2000, the Supreme 
Court suggested a rehabilitative view of supervised release.183 The 
question there was whether a defendant who had over-served a prison 
sentence could have his term of supervised release shortened based on 
the excess time he spent in prison.184 Once again relying solely on the 
statutory language, the Court unanimously held that the answer was 
no—the defendant had to serve his full term of supervised release 
beginning on the date he actually left prison.185 Although the Court 
found that “the text of [the statute] resolves the case,” it also noted that 
this “conclusion accord[ed] with the statute’s purpose and design.”186 
“Supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those 
 
 176. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000); United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 
(2000); Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395 (1991).  
 177. 498 U.S. 395 (1991). 
 178. Id. at 408–09. 
 179. Id. at 399–410. 
 180. Id. at 400–01. 
 181. Id. at 407–08. 
 182. 529 U.S. 53 (2000). 
 183. Id. at 53–54. 
 184. Id. at 54. 
 185. Id. at 56–59. 
 186. Id. at 59. 
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served by incarceration,” the Court said, so it would make no sense to 
“treat[] [a defendant’s] time in prison as interchangeable with his term 
of supervised release.”187 
Finally, in the similarly titled Johnson v. United States188 decided 
the same year, the Supreme Court gave its fullest view to date of 
supervised release, comparing the system to parole over a strong 
dissent.189 This case asked whether a 1994 amendment empowering 
judges to impose additional terms of supervised release on defendants 
who had violated their initial terms of supervision applied 
retroactively.190 The Court again relied primarily on a textual analysis, 
holding that regardless of the amendment, pre-1994 statutory language 
permitted judges to impose the additional terms of supervision.191 
Having resolved the statutory question, the Supreme Court added 
that there was “nothing surprising about the consequences of our 
reading,” since it “serv[ed] the evident congressional purpose . . . in 
providing for a term of supervised release.”192 Supervised release was 
designed to “improve the odds of a successful transition from the 
prison to liberty,” and therefore judges should be able to impose 
additional terms of supervision on those offenders who needed it.193 
The Court also noted that supervised release was “closely analogous” 
to parole, and that it was consistent with parole practice to impose 
additional supervision on prisoners after their release was revoked.194 
Justice Scalia dissented, primarily disagreeing with the majority’s 
statutory analysis, but also criticizing its analogy to parole.195 
Observing that “the Sentencing Reform Act’s adoption of supervised 
release was meant to make a significant break with prior practice,”196 
he found “the Court’s effort to equate parole and supervised 
release . . . unpersuasive.”197 “Unlike parole, which replaced a portion 
of a defendant’s prison sentence,” he observed, “supervised release is 
 
 187. Id. at 59–60. 
 188. 529 U.S. 694 (2000). 
 189. Id. (holding that district courts have the authority to order terms of supervised release 
following reimprisonment). 
 190. Id. at 696–98. 
 191. Id. at 701–08. 
 192. Id. at 708–10. 
 193. Id. at 708–09. 
 194. Id. at 710–11. 
 195. Id. at 715–25 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 196. Id. at 724–25. 
 197. Id. at 725. 
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a separate term imposed at the time of initial sentencing.”198 
Ultimately, however, he did not appear particularly invested in this 
distinction, concluding that “[t]his is not an important case, since it 
deals with the interpretation of a statute that has been amended to 
eliminate, for the future, the issue we today resolve.”199 
C.  Circuit Courts’ Application of Parole Precedents 
to Supervised Release 
Without Supreme Court guidance, the courts of appeals 
unanimously concluded that supervised release was merely a 
continuation of the old parole system and therefore governed by the 
old parole precedents. Many circuit courts simply applied the Supreme 
Court’s parole precedents to supervised release without analysis.200 
Others specifically held that “[p]arole, probation, and supervised 
release revocation hearings are constitutionally indistinguishable” and 
therefore “analyzed in the same manner.”201 Citing Morrissey, 
Gagnon, and Moody, the circuit courts concluded that defendants 
facing revocation of their supervised release were entitled to the same 
minimal standard of due process as parolees. 
The Fourth Circuit’s 1992 decision in United States v. Copley202 
is an early example. There, the defendant argued that the district court 
had violated his right to due process by failing to provide him with an 
 
 198. Id.  
 199. Id. at 727. 
 200. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 852 F.3d 1204, 1206 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he due process 
guarantees associated with [supervised release] proceedings are ‘minimal.’” (quoting Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485, 489 (1972))); United States v. Sistrunk, 612 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 
2010) (“When a person is charged with violating a condition of supervised release, he is entitled to 
minimal due process rights prior to revocation of supervised release.” (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. 
at 480–82)); United States v. Gomez-Gonzalez, 277 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Morrissey 
due process requirements also apply to revocations of supervised release. . . . Like parole . . . fewer 
constitutional safeguards are needed to protect the conditional liberty interest during supervised 
release.”); United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1123 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[M]ost of the fundamental 
constitutional procedural protections that are normally applicable to a criminal prosecution are not 
required for supervised-release proceedings as a matter of constitutional law.” (citing Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973))); United States v. Martin, 984 F.2d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(“In Morrissey v. Brewer . . . the Supreme Court defined certain minimal due process requirements 
for parole revocation. . . . supervised release revocation[] incorporates these same minimal due 
process requisites.”). 
 201. United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 985 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. 
McCormick, 54 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he same protections granted those facing 
revocation of parole are required for those facing the revocation of supervised release.”); United 
States v. Copeland, 20 F.3d 412, 414 (11th Cir. 1994) (same). 
 202. 978 F.2d 829 (4th Cir. 1992). 
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adequate written explanation of why it had revoked his supervised 
release.203 The court of appeals disagreed, citing the reduced 
constitutional protections for parole revocation under Gagnon and 
Morrissey, and holding that “[l]ogic would extend this protection to 
hearings to revoke supervised release,” since “[s]upervised release and 
probation differ only in that the former follows a prison term and the 
latter is in lieu of a prison term.”204 Other circuit courts later cited this 
case for the proposition that “[t]he same protections granted those 
facing revocation of parole are required for those facing the revocation 
of supervised release.”205 
Fifteen years later in United States v. Carlton,206 the Second 
Circuit applied similar reasoning to hold that defendants facing 
revocation of supervised release had no right to a jury or proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt.207 The defendant there challenged the 
constitutionality of the supervised release system on the ground that 
“it empower[ed] a district court to revoke his term of supervised 
release without a jury trial and based on findings that are not proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of his constitutional rights 
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.”208 The court of appeals 
rejected this argument by citing Gagnon and Morrissey and explaining 
that “the ‘full panoply of rights’ due a defendant in a criminal 
prosecution does not apply to revocation hearings for parole . . . or for 
supervised release, [both] of which are virtually indistinguishable for 
purposes of due process analysis.”209 
 
 203. Id. at 831. 
 204. Id. at 831 & n.*. 
 205. Copeland, 20 F.3d at 414 (citing Copley, 978 F.2d at 831); see also McCormick, 54 F.3d 
at 221 (“[T]he same protections granted those facing revocation of parole are required for those 
facing the revocation of supervised release.” (citing Copeland, 20 F.3d at 414)). 
 206. 442 F.3d 801 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 207. Id. at 810. 
 208. Id. at 807. This case was similar to Haymond but with one significant difference—the 
district court was not required to impose a mandatory minimum revocation sentence. See United 
States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2383–84 (2019) (“As we have emphasized, our decision is 
limited to § 3583(k)—an unusual provision enacted little more than a decade ago—and the Alleyne 
problem raised by its five-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. . . . Section 3583(e), 
which governs supervised release revocation proceedings generally, does not contain any similar 
mandatory minimum triggered by judge-found facts.”). 
 209. Carlton, 442 F.3d at 807 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Gavilanes-Ocaranza, 
772 F.3d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[R]evocation of supervised release [and] revocation of 
parole . . . must be analyzed the same way when we consider Sixth Amendment . . . trial by jury 
claims.”). 
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In myriad other cases, circuit courts have analogized supervised 
release to parole in order to deny defendants’ constitutional rights. The 
Fifth Circuit applied Morrissey to hold that defendants facing 
revocation of their supervised release had no rights under the 
Confrontation Clause, because “[i]n determining the scope of the right 
to confrontation at revocation hearings, we follow Supreme Court 
precedent addressing that right in the similar context of parole 
proceedings.”210 The Eleventh Circuit quoted Morrissey in holding 
that a district court had not violated due process by failing to give a 
defendant notice that it would hold ambiguous drug tests against him, 
saying the court did nothing wrong by “engag[ing] in the ‘predictive 
and discretionary’ task of revocation sentencing . . . by referencing 
without prior notice conduct that . . . was ‘part of [the defendant’s] 
behavior while on’ supervised release.”211 Even when deciding in 
favor of a defendant in an Ex Post Facto case, the Ninth Circuit noted 
that “[s]upervised release and parole are virtually identical systems. 
Under each, a defendant serves a portion of a sentence in prison and a 
portion under supervision outside prison walls. If a defendant violates 
the terms of his release, he may be incarcerated once more.”212 
Not only have the courts of appeals applied parole precedents to 
supervised release, they have also affirmatively rejected arguments 
attempting to distinguish between them. In United States v. Frazier,213 
the Eleventh Circuit held that the Federal Rules of Evidence did not 
 
 210. United States v. Jimison, 825 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2016); see also United States v. 
Reese, 775 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding there is no right to confrontation in 
supervised release revocation because “courts treat revocations the same whether they involve 
probation, parole, or supervised release”); United States v. Kelley, 446 F.3d 688, 690–91 (7th Cir. 
2006) (“Morrissey held that due process requires a flexible notice-and-hearing procedure—
including a limited right of confrontation—in the revocation context.” (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471, 488–90 (1972))); United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Because 
‘[r]evocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, 
but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions’ 
the full protection provided to criminal defendants, including the Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation, does not apply to them.” (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480)). 
 211. United States v. Warren, 720 F.3d 321, 330 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. 
at 480). 
 212. United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. 
Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1121 (2d Cir. 1994) (“We conclude that for purposes of analyzing the 
applicable constitutional protections, a charge of supervised-release violation is virtually 
indistinguishable from a charge of violation of parole.”); United States v. Parriett, 974 F.2d 523, 
526 n.2 (4th Cir. 1992) (“We can find no persuasive reason to distinguish between the standards of 
parole eligibility . . . and the conditions for revocation of supervised release, at issue in the present 
case.”). 
 213. 26 F.3d 110 (11th Cir. 1994). 
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apply to supervised release because they did not apply to parole, and 
the two systems were “conceptually the same.”214 The court rebuffed 
the defendant’s argument that parole differed from supervised release 
because it was “granted as a matter of grace, and w[as] not supervised 
by the judicial branch, whereas supervised release is mandatory and is 
administered by the court.”215 “Although the administration of 
supervised release is somewhat different than that of . . . parole,” the 
court noted, “the purpose and theory of [both] types of release are 
essentially identical.”216 
The Fourth Circuit similarly denied any distinction between the 
two systems in United States v. Armstrong,217 holding that the 
exclusionary rule did not apply to supervised release revocations 
because it did not apply to parole.218 The court firmly rejected the 
defendant’s attempt to differentiate supervised release from parole, 
declaring that “parole and supervised release are not just analogous, 
but virtually indistinguishable.”219 “Although supervised release 
revocation proceedings, unlike parole revocation hearings, do take 
place before a judge,” the court noted, “they are characterized by the 
same ‘flexibility’” as parole hearings.220 
Despite this overwhelming consensus, it is worth noting that a 
few judges have reached a different conclusion about the relationship 
between parole and supervised release. In his Johnson dissent, Justice 
Scalia stressed the “break” that occurred when Congress replaced 
parole with supervised release,221 and Judge Posner of the Seventh 
Circuit emphasized their differences in a decision criticizing “judicial 
insouciance” in the imposition of supervised release.222 He reasoned: 
Parole shortens prison time, substituting restrictions on the 
freed prisoner. Supervised release does not shorten prison 
time; instead it imposes restrictions on the prisoner to take 
effect upon his release from prison. Parole mitigates 
punishment; supervised release augments it—most 
 
 214. Id. at 113. 
 215. Id. at 113 n.2. 
 216. Id. 
 217. 187 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 218. Id. at 393 (citing Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998)). 
 219. Id. at 394. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 724–25 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 222. United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.); see also United 
States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 2015) (Posner, J.). 
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dramatically when the defendant, having been determined to 
have violated a condition or conditions of supervised release, 
is given, as punishment, a fresh term of imprisonment.223 
While a few other judges have also pointed out differences between 
supervised release and parole, these observations have not made any 
impact in the realm of constitutional law.224 Indeed, despite Judge 
Posner’s decisions, the rule in the Seventh Circuit remains that 
“Morrissey . . . sets out the due process requirements for purposes of 
supervised release revocation hearings.”225 
D.  Supreme Court Breaks Its Silence on Supervised Release 
The Supreme Court finally broke its long silence on supervised 
release in 2019 with a 4–1–4 decision in United States v. Haymond.226 
Fractured into a four-vote plurality and a single-Justice concurrence, 
a majority of the Court concluded that one provision of the supervised 
release statute violated the defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial.227 Although all the Justices acknowledged that 
supervised release differed from parole insofar as it added to the 
sentence rather than reducing it, they disagreed vigorously about the 
constitutional significance of this distinction.228 
Haymond concerned the constitutionality of section 3583(k), title 
18 of the United States Code, a provision of the supervised release 
statute enacted in 2003 that imposed a five-year minimum sentence on 
sex offenders who violated their supervised release by committing 
another sex offense.229 The petitioner had been convicted of 
possessing child pornography and sentenced to thirty-eight months’ 
 
 223. Thompson, 777 F.3d. at 372. 
 224. See United States v. Trotter, 321 F. Supp. 3d 337, 346–47 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); see also 
United States v. King, 891 F.3d 868, 870 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 225. United States v. Neal, 512 F.3d 427, 435 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 226. United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019) (holding “federal statute governing 
revocation of supervised release, authorizing a new mandatory minimum sentence based on a 
judge’s fact-finding by a preponderance of the evidence, violated the Due Process Clause and the 
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, as applied”). The Supreme Court also issued another technical 
decision on supervised release, holding that a term of supervision is tolled while a defendant is held 
in pretrial detention for a new criminal offense, so long as he later receives credit for that period of 
detention as time served on the new offense. See Mont v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1826 (2019) 
(interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)). 
 227. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2382. 
 228. Id. at 2379, 2386. 
 229. Id. at 2374. 
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imprisonment followed by ten years’ supervised release.230 He 
completed his prison sentence and began his term of supervision, but 
was eventually found with more child pornography on his computers 
and cellphone.231 The government sought to revoke his supervised 
release and send him back to prison.232 At the revocation hearing, the 
district court concluded “under a preponderance of the evidence rather 
than a reasonable doubt standard” that the defendant had knowingly 
downloaded and possessed thirteen of the images, but found 
“insufficient evidence” to show that he had knowingly accessed the 
remaining forty-six images.233 The court described the five-year 
minimum sentence as excessive and even “repugnant,” but was 
compelled to impose it on the defendant, stating that “[w]ere it not for 
[the] mandatory minimum . . . he ‘probably would have sentenced in 
the range of two years or less.’”234 
The Supreme Court held that the five-year mandatory minimum 
violated the defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial.235 The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Gorsuch, described 
this conclusion as a “clear” application of the Court’s prior decisions 
in Apprendi v. New Jersey and Alleyne v. United States.236 Apprendi 
held that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”237 Alleyne extended this rule to facts that 
increased the statutory mandatory minimum sentence.238 Section 
3583(k) violated Apprendi and Alleyne, because it allowed “judicial 
factfinding” to “trigger[] a new punishment in the form of a prison 
term of at least five years and up to life.”239 
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Gorsuch specifically rejected 
the government’s argument that “[section] 3583(k)’s supervised 
release revocation procedures are practically identical to historic 
parole and probation revocation procedures,” which Morrissey and 
 
 230. Id. at 2373. 
 231. Id. at 2374. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 2375. 
 235. See id. at 2378–79; id. at 2386 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 236. Id. at 2381. 
 237. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
 238. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 112 (2013). 
 239. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2378 (plurality opinion) (citing Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 115). 
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Gagnon found “to comport with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.”240 
That comparison, he said, “overlook[ed] a critical difference between 
[section] 3583(k) and traditional parole and probation practices.”241 
Under parole, the defendant was released early from his prison 
sentence, and if he violated a condition, was sent back to prison “to 
serve only the remaining prison term authorized by statute for his 
original crime of conviction.”242 But “[a]ll that changed beginning in 
1984” when “Congress overhauled federal sentencing procedures to 
make prison terms more determinate and abolish the practice of 
parole.”243 Now, the defendant must serve his prison sentence in full, 
followed by a term of supervised release “to encourage rehabilitation 
after the completion” of the prison term.244 
This difference “bears constitutional consequences,” Justice 
Gorsuch explained, because parole violations “generally exposed a 
defendant only to the remaining prison term authorized for his crime 
of conviction,” while supervised release violations may “expose a 
defendant to an additional . . . prison term well beyond that authorized 
by the jury’s verdict.”245 Furthermore, he noted, section 3583(k) 
“differs . . . not only from parole and probation,” but also “from the 
supervised release practices that . . . govern most federal criminal 
proceedings today,” since “[u]nlike all those procedures, [section] 
3583(k) alone requires a substantial increase in the minimum sentence 
to which a defendant may be exposed.”246 Therefore, section 3583(k), 
“offends the Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ ancient protections,” while 
parole revocation did not.247 
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment. He opposed applying 
Apprendi to supervised release because of “potentially destabilizing 
consequences.”248 Nevertheless, he concluded that section 3583(k) 
violated the right to a jury trial because it functioned “less like 
ordinary revocation and more like punishment for a new offense” by 
targeting a “discrete set of federal criminal offenses” and “imposing a 
 
 240. Id. at 2381 (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 
U.S. 471 (1972)). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 2382. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 2385 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.”249 Justice Breyer 
emphasized, however, that parole and supervised release revocations 
were otherwise comparable, asserting that “the role of the judge in a 
supervised-release proceeding is consistent with traditional parole” 
and “Congress did not intend the system of supervised release to differ 
from parole in this respect.”250 
Justice Alito dissented, castigating the plurality opinion as “not 
based on the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment . . . 
irreconcilable with precedent, and sport[ing] rhetoric with potentially 
revolutionary implications.”251 Based on a lengthy historical and 
linguistic analysis of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial clause, he 
concluded that supervised release revocation was not a “criminal 
prosecution” and therefore Apprendi and Alleyne did not apply.252 
Justice Alito also disputed the plurality’s distinction between 
parole and supervised release. While he acknowledged that parole cut 
short a prison sentence and supervised release adds to it, he insisted 
that “this difference is purely formal and should have no constitutional 
consequences.”253 Far from distinctive, he suggested, supervised 
release is the “substantive equivalent” of parole.254 
Here is an example: A pre-SRA sentence of nine years’ 
imprisonment meant three years of certain confinement and 
six years of possible confinement depending on the 
defendant’s conduct in the outside world after release from 
prison. At least for present purposes, such a sentence is the 
substantive equivalent of a post-SRA sentence of three years’ 
imprisonment followed by six years of supervised release. In 
both situations, the period of certain confinement (three 
years) and the maximum term of possible confinement (nine 
years) are the same.255 
“Once this is understood,” Justice Alito concluded, “it follows that the 
procedures that must be followed at a supervised-release revocation 
proceeding are the same that had to be followed at a parole revocation 
 
 249. Id. at 2386. 
 250. Id. at 2385. 
 251. Id. at 2386 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 252. See id. at 2392–2400. 
 253. Id. at 2388. 
 254. Id. at 2390. 
 255. Id.  
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proceeding, and these were settled long ago” in Gagnon and 
Morrissey.256 
IV.  SUPERVISED RELEASE IS NOT PAROLE 
Haymond marks the first time the Supreme Court recognized a 
distinction between parole and supervised release: parole shortened 
prison time, whereas supervised release is imposed in addition to a 
prison sentence.257 The Justices disagreed sharply about the 
constitutional significance of this distinction, but compared to past 
precedents, their opinions still offer a clearer view of the relationship 
between parole and supervised release. Nevertheless, the Justices also 
overlooked other important distinctions between parole and 
supervised release, which have significant consequences for the 
constitutional law of community supervision. In fact, there are three 
important differences between parole and supervised release: 
• Parole was a relief from punishment, while supervised 
release is an additional penalty. 
• Parole revocation was rehabilitative, while supervised 
release revocation is punitive. 
• Parole was run by an administrative agency, while 
supervised release is controlled by district courts. 
Because of these differences, the Supreme Court’s parole 
revocation precedents do not apply to supervised release. Instead, 
defendants on supervised release deserve more procedural protections 
before their release is revoked. 
A.  Relief Versus Penalty 
The clearest difference between parole and supervised release is 
that parole was a relief from punishment, whereas supervised release 
is an additional penalty. Justice Gorsuch noted in Haymond that 
“unlike parole, supervised release wasn’t introduced to replace a 
portion of the defendant’s prison term,” but rather to run “after the 
completion of his prison term.”258 Justice Alito also recognized this 
distinction, although he said it was “purely formal and should have no 
 
 256. Id. at 2391 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1972) and Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.5 (1973)). 
 257. Years before Haymond, Justice Scalia made the same observation in dissent. See Johnson 
v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 725 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 258. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2382 (plurality opinion). 
(7) 53.3_SCHUMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 7/7/2020  2:51 PM 
624 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:587 
constitutional consequences.”259 But because the Justices focused on 
the technical application of the Apprendi rule, they did not consider 
how this difference affected the broader due-process balancing 
analysis from Morrissey. Because the balance of interests under 
supervised release favors defendants rather than the government, 
defendants deserve more procedural protections than parolees before 
their release is revoked. 
Morrissey’s balancing of interests for parole revocations 
depended on parole’s unique nature as a relief from punishment. The 
Court described parole supervision fundamentally as an exchange 
between the government and the parolee⎯the government gave the 
parolee an enormous benefit by releasing him early from an otherwise 
lawful prison sentence, and in return, the parolee promised to comply 
with “many restrictions not applicable to other citizens.”260 Despite 
those restrictions, this bargain substantially benefited the parolee, 
“enabl[ing] him to do a wide range of things open to persons who have 
never been convicted of any crime.”261 Because the government had 
taken a “risk” by releasing the parolee early, it had an “overwhelming 
interest” in being able to revoke his parole without a full criminal 
trial.262 And because the parolee’s liberty was “properly dependent on 
observance of special parole restrictions,” he had a weaker interest in 
fighting revocation.263 
But this logic does not translate to supervised release. Because 
the defendant is no longer granted early release from prison, the term 
of post-release supervision no longer reflects an exchange between 
him and the government. Instead, the defendant must serve his prison 
term in full, followed by an additional term of supervised release. The 
government takes no “risk,” because it does not release the defendant 
early, and the defendant’s freedom is not granted to him “dependent 
on observance of special parole restrictions,” but rather earned after 
full service of a prison sentence.264 This difference shifts the balance 
of interests between the defendant and the government, giving the 
defendant a stronger interest in fighting revocation, and the 
government a weaker interest in avoiding a full criminal trial. 
 
 259. Id. at 2388 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 260. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 483. 
 263. Id. at 480. 
 264. Id. 
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Indeed, as District Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of 
New York has observed, using the word “revoke” in reference to 
supervised release is “somewhat of a misnomer.”265 He explained:  
Parole was based on early release from prison—by the grace 
of the parole board a person was conditionally released from 
prison, and the leniency could be “revoked.” A person on 
supervised release has completed his or her prison term and 
is serving an independent term of supervision separately 
ordered by the court. Supervised release is not being 
“revoked”; rather, a supervisee is being punished for 
violating conditions.266 
Justice Kavanaugh put it similarly at the Haymond oral argument: 
“Revocation of parole seems to me seems like a denied benefit, 
whereas revocation of supervised release seems like a penalty.”267 
Another way the relief/penalty distinction affects the 
constitutional analysis is in changing the timing of when conditions of 
release are imposed. The Parole Commission set parole conditions at 
the same time that it released the parolee from prison, using his 
institutional record as “one of the most significant factors” in its 
decision.268 Parole violations were therefore considered a sign that the 
defendant was “not adjusting properly and [could not] be counted on 
to avoid antisocial activity.”269 
Conditions of supervised release, by contrast, are imposed by the 
district judge at sentencing—before the defendant begins the prison 
term, and long before he will return to the community. Therefore, the 
judge must “guess at the time of sentencing what conditions are likely 
to make sense in what may be the distant future.”270 As a result, “many 
district judges simply list the conditions that they impose, devoting 
 
 265. United States v. Trotter, 321 F. Supp. 3d 337, 346 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 266. Id. at 346–47. 
 267. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019) 
(No. 17-1672). 
 268. Moody v. Daggert, 429 U.S. 78, 89 (1976); see also Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal 
& Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15 (1979) (“The behavior record of an inmate during confinement 
is critical in the sense that it reflects the degree to which the inmate is prepared to adjust to parole 
release.”). 
 269. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479. 
 270. United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 374 (7th Cir. 2015). While conditions of release 
can be changed after imposition, “modification is a bother for the judge, especially when, as must 
be common in cases involving very long sentences, modification becomes the responsibility of the 
sentencing judge’s successor.” United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, 
J.). 
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little or no time at sentencing to explaining them or justifying their 
imposition.”271 The empirical evidence shows that in most cases, 
judges are not “making any reasoned prediction, and instead are 
simply putting everybody on supervised release,” imposing conditions 
“without any apparent consideration of either an individual’s risk to 
public safety or his or her rehabilitation needs.”272 
Because supervised release conditions are imposed without the 
same reflection or evidentiary foundation as parole conditions, 
violations are less likely to be warning signs of antisocial conduct. 
Technical violations in particular—missed appointments, positive 
drug tests, breached curfews, etc.273—are not necessarily signs that the 
defendant is failing to adjust to the community. These conditions are 
selected long before the defendant’s release from prison, without a 
fully informed judgment of what is necessary to ensure a successful 
return to the community. The government therefore has a weaker 
interest in punishing supervised release violations, and the defendant 
a stronger claim to his liberty. 
B.  Rehabilitation Versus Punishment 
Another important difference between parole and supervised 
release is that parole revocation was rehabilitative, while supervised 
release revocation is punitive. None of the opinions in Haymond 
recognized this distinction, with the plurality asserting that supervised 
release serves to “encourage rehabilitation,”274 and the dissent 
claiming that it ensures defendants are “sufficiently reformed” and 
“able to lead a law-abiding life.”275 The circuit courts have similarly 
applied parole precedents to supervised release by emphasizing their 
shared rehabilitative character,276 citing the legislative history of the 
Sentencing Reform Act as evidence that supervised release “fulfills 
rehabilitative ends.”277 In reality, however, supervised release 
 
 271. Thompson, 777 F.3d at 373. 
 272. Scott-Hayward, supra note 10, at 183, 216. 
 273. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3(a)(4) & (7), (c)(1)–(6), (d)(4) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). 
 274. United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2382 (2019). 
 275. Id. at 2389 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 276. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 711 F.3d 174, 177–78 (D.C. Cir. 2013); United States v. 
Buchanan, 638 F.3d 448, 451 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Engelhorn, 122 F.3d 508, 511 (8th 
Cir. 1997). 
 277. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000) (“Congress intended supervised 
release to assist individuals in their transition to community life. Supervised release fulfills 
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revocation is far more punitive than parole revocation, entitling 
defendants to more procedural protections before their release is 
revoked. 
On the most basic level, parole encouraged rehabilitation by 
promising to reduce punishment, while supervised release does not. 
From the beginnings of Maconochie’s mark system, the promise of 
early release was meant to reform criminal offenders by encouraging 
their good behavior. Supervised release, however, is added to a prison 
sentence, not deducted from it. No matter how the prisoner behaves, 
he will have to serve his term of imprisonment in full, followed by his 
term of supervised release. 
More broadly, parole revocation was governed by a rehabilitative 
theory of punishment, which supervised release revocation officially 
excludes. Parole was rooted in a “medical” theory of imprisonment 
that viewed offenders as “sick” and needing to be “cured” through 
incarceration.278 Parole conditions were meant to guide the parolee’s 
“restoration . . . into normal society,”279 with violations signaling that 
the parolee was “not adjusting properly”280 and needed more 
“treatment” in prison.281 Yet the Sentencing Reform Act rejected the 
medical model of imprisonment, instructing district judges to 
“consider the specified rationales of punishment except for 
rehabilitation,” which they must “acknowledge as an unsuitable 
justification for a prison term.”282 While the Parole Commission based 
revocation decisions on rehabilitative concerns, judges are 
affirmatively prohibited from taking these considerations into account 
when they revoke supervised release.283 
 
rehabilitative ends . . . . ‘[T]he primary goal of supervised release is to ease the defendant’s 
transition into the community after the service of a long prison term for a particularly serious 
offense, or to provide rehabilitation to a defendant who has spent a fairly short period in prison for 
punishment or other purposes but still needs supervision and training programs after release.’” 
(quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 124 (1983))); see also United States v. Aldeen, 792 F.3d 247, 252 
(2d Cir. 2015) (quoting same); United States v. Pierce, 75 F.3d 173, 177 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting 
same). 
 278. Dershowitz, supra note 81, at 128. 
 279. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 478 (1972). 
 280. Id. at 479. 
 281. Dershowitz, supra note 81, at 128. 
 282. Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 327 (2011) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a)). 
Indeed, the Act did not even give courts the ability to ensure that the defendants they sentenced 
received rehabilitative services in prison. Id. at 330. 
 283. Initially, this rule did not affect defendants on supervised release, because the Act did not 
include a revocation mechanism. See Biderman & Sands, supra note 10, at 204. In 1986, however, 
Congress added a provision for revoking supervised release, and the circuit courts have since 
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In addition to excluding rehabilitation, the circuit courts have also 
held that judges should revoke supervised release for primarily 
retributive reasons. Although the Sentencing Reform Act omitted “just 
punishment” as a factor for judges to consider when revoking 
supervised release,284 a majority of the courts have nevertheless 
concluded that “consideration of the gravity of the violation of 
supervised release . . . is not prohibited,” because the statute does not 
expressly “foreclose a court from considering ‘other pertinent factors,’ 
such as . . . ‘the seriousness of the offense.’”285 Emphasizing a 
punitive element that the statute itself omits, the courts now declare 
that “revocation sentences are . . . intended to ‘sanction,’ or, 
analogously, to ‘provide just punishment for the offense’ of violating 
supervised release.”286 Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Haymond 
endorsed this view: “The consequences that flow from violation of the 
conditions of supervised release are first and foremost considered 
sanctions for the defendant’s . . . failure to follow the court-imposed 
conditions.”287 The Sentencing Guidelines include the same 
instruction, stating that courts should revoke supervised release to 
“sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into 
account . . . the seriousness of the underlying violation and the 
criminal history of the violator.”288 
 
unanimously concluded that the prohibition on considering rehabilitation also applies to revocation. 
See United States v. Schonewolf, 905 F.3d 683, 690 (3d Cir. 2018); United States v. Vandergrift, 
754 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Lifshitz, 714 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2013); 
United States v. Garza, 706 F.3d 655, 657–59 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Deen, 706 F.3d 760, 
765–67 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 197–98 (4th Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Mendiola, 696 F.3d 1033, 1041–42 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Taylor, 679 F.3d 
1005, 1006–07 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Grant, 664 F.3d 276, 280–81 (9th Cir. 2011); 
United States v. Molignaro, 649 F.3d 1, 2–5 (1st Cir. 2011) (Souter, J., by designation). 
 284. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2), 3583(e)(3) (2012). 
 285. United States v. Young, 634 F.3d 233, 238 (3d Cir. 2011); see also United States v. 
Phillips, 791 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 641–42 (4th Cir. 
2013); United States v. Vargas–Dávila, 649 F.3d 129, 131–32 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Lewis, 498 F.3d 393, 400 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 47–48 (2d Cir. 
2006). But see United States v. Miller, 634 F.3d 841, 844 (5th Cir. 2011) (judge may not consider 
punishment in revoking release); United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1181–83 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(“In sum, at a revocation sentencing, a court may appropriately sanction a violator for his ‘breach 
of trust,’ but may not punish him for the criminal conduct underlying the revocation.”). 
 286. Lewis, 498 F.3d at 400; see also Biderman & Sands, supra note 10, at 206 (“There is no 
real distinction between what the [Sentencing] Commission calls the breach of trust and the 
seriousness of the underlying violation. The releasee is punished for the new conduct with 
additional time added on to reflect the criminal history.”). 
 287. United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2386 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
 288. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A3(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). 
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Finally, Congress made supervised release harsher and more 
expansive through a series of amendments in the late 1980s, 1990s, 
and 2000s. Although supervised release was originally designed to 
provide transitional support only for defendants in need, courts now 
impose a term of supervision in virtually all eligible cases.289 While 
the system was supposed to ease return to the community, courts now 
impose more conditions of release,290 revoke release more often, and 
revoke release more frequently for technical infractions.291 “What was 
originally designed to assist re-integration into the community,” 
instead is “facilitating reincarceration.”292 
The punishing character of supervised release revocation stands 
in stark contrast to the rehabilitative logic underlying the Supreme 
Court’s parole revocation precedents. Morrissey, Gagnon, and Moody 
all repeatedly invoked parole’s beneficent purpose when limiting 
parolees’ constitutional rights, stressing that the system had a 
“rehabilitative rather than punitive focus.”293 Parole officials could be 
trusted because “by and large concern for the client dominates [their] 
professional attitude.”294 Parole revocations needed to be informal 
because “[t]he objective is to return a prisoner to a full family and 
community life,” and the inquiry was “not purely factual but also 
predictive and discretionary.”295 And making parole revocations too 
procedural would actually harm parolees by making the hearing “less 
attuned to the rehabilitative needs of the individual.”296 Because 
supervised release revocations exclude rehabilitative considerations 
and instead focus on punishment, these justifications for reduced 
constitutional protections do not apply. Defendants on supervised 
 
 289. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 120, at 4, 49–50. 
 290. See Petersilia, supra note 49, at 507. 
 291. See Wooten, supra note 104, at 185; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 120, 
at 68 (“[T]echnical violations accounted for the majority (51.6 percent) of all violations from 2005 
to 2008.”); Doherty, supra note 10, at 1016 (“In any one year, roughly sixty percent of revocations 
are for non-criminal conduct.”); Whiteside, supra note 10, at 211 (“Approximately one-half of the 
districts report that there are more revocation actions than in the past.”). 
 292. Biderman & Sands, supra note 10, at 204. 
 293. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785 (1973). 
 294. Id. at 783–84. 
 295. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 495, 480 (1972); see also Moody v. Dagget, 429 U.S. 
78, 89 (1976) (requiring the Parole Commission to convene prompt revocation hearings would 
impede its “prediction as to the ability of the individual to live in society without committing 
antisocial acts”). 
 296. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787–88. 
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release are therefore entitled to more procedural rights than parolees 
before their release is revoked. 
C.  Agency Versus Courts 
The third and final difference between parole and supervised 
release is that parole was run by an agency—the Parole Commission—
while supervised release is controlled by district courts. The Supreme 
Court acknowledged this distinction in Gozlon-Peretz, noting that “the 
sentencing court, rather than the Parole Commission, . . . oversee[s] 
the defendant’s postconfinement monitoring.”297 In his Haymond 
concurrence, however, Justice Breyer made the surprising claim that 
“the role of the judge in a supervised-release proceeding is consistent 
with traditional parole” and “Congress did not intend the system of 
supervised release to differ from parole in this respect.”298 That 
comparison is hard to square with the significant differences between 
the Parole Commission and district courts.299 While the Supreme 
Court’s parole precedents emphasized the need for flexibility in 
administrative hearings, judicial proceedings are more amenable to 
protecting defendants’ procedural rights. 
The Supreme Court strived to avoid adding procedural rules to 
parole revocations because it feared that they would “alter 
significantly the nature of the proceeding,” by changing “[t]he role of 
the hearing body . . . [into] that of a judge at a trial.”300 The Court 
warned that making revocation proceedings too procedural might 
actually disadvantage the parolee, since “[i]n the greater self-
consciousness of its quasi-judicial role, the hearing body may be less 
tolerant of marginal deviant behavior and feel more pressure to 
reincarcerate than to continue nonpunitive rehabilitation.”301 
The Court also stressed that in a parole revocation, the 
government was not represented by a prosecutor, but by a parole 
officer, who “recognizes his double duty to the welfare of his clients 
 
 297. Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 400–01 (1991). 
 298. United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2385 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 299. When a special study committee recommended in 1990 that jurisdiction over supervised 
release be transferred to a specialized agency like the Parole Commission, the Judicial Conference 
of the United States opposed the idea. Adair, supra note 10. 
 300. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787; see also Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 
442 U.S. 1, 8 (1979) (saying that parole decisions “[differ] from the traditional mold of judicial 
decisionmaking in that the choice involves a synthesis of record facts and personal observation 
filtered through the experience of the decisionmaker”). 
 301. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 788. 
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and to the safety of the general community,” and views revocation “as 
a failure of supervision.”302 Because of this professional attitude, “he 
has been entrusted traditionally with broad discretion to judge” the 
parolee and “armed with the power to recommend or even to declare 
revocation.”303 The Court emphasized that “[c]ontrol over the required 
proceedings by the hearing officers can assure that delaying tactics and 
other abuses sometimes present in the traditional adversary trial 
situation do not occur.”304 
Supervised release revocations, by contrast, are held in district 
court, and therefore by definition are before “a judge at a trial.”305 
They are also deeply adversarial because the defendant has a statutory 
right to counsel and the United States Attorney’s Office represents the 
government.306 Indeed, federal prosecutors now play a prominent role 
at revocation hearings: 
At the hearing, the United States Attorney prosecutes the 
petition, that is, calls witnesses and presents evidence in 
support of the allegations of violation in the petitions. The 
probation officer sits separately from the United States 
Attorney, and her participation in the guilt-or-innocence 
phase of the proceeding is limited to being a sworn witness, 
if she is called either by the United States Attorney, the 
defendant, or the court. At the hearing, the probation officer 
makes no presentation or recommendation as to the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant; only the defendant or his 
attorney and the United States Attorney argue the 
defendant’s guilt or innocence.307 
Unlike probation officers, federal prosecutors are trained to obtain 
convictions and long sentences. They have no “duty” to the defendant 
and do not view revocation as a “failure” of their own work.308 
 
 302. Id. at 783, 785 (quoting FRANK J. REMINGTON ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
ADMINISTRATION, MATERIALS & CASES, 910–11 (1969). 
 303. Id. at 784. 
 304. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489–90 (1972). 
 305. Cf. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787–88 (explaining that parole revocations require flexibility so 
as not to turn the hearing body into “a judge at a trial”). 
 306. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (2012); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a)(3)(B). 
 307. United States v. Burnette, 980 F. Supp. 1429, 1434 (M.D. Ala. 1997); see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3603(8)(B) (2012) (requiring probation officers to report supervised-release violations “to the 
Attorney General or his designee”). 
 308. Cf. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 783–85 (explaining that probation officers have a duty to their 
clients and treat revocation as a failure of supervision). 
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Revocation decisions are also no longer informed by the expert 
judgment of the Parole Commission and its “administrative officers,” 
to whom the Supreme Court gave “broad discretion.”309 Instead, 
district judges make decisions to revoke supervised release based on 
the recommendation of “a single probation officer,”310 who does not 
disclose “the scientific basis (if there is a scientific basis) of his 
recommendation . . . in his presentence report.”311 The role of the 
probation office has changed as well, as a shrinking number of officers 
have been asked to supervise more and more offenders,312 leading 
them to “spend disproportionate time on enforcement (that is, 
investigating violations . . . and recommending punishments)” with 
“little time left over for suggesting appropriate conditions and helping 
the probationer to comply with them.”313 
Providing constitutional protections for defendants in these trial-
like proceedings will not “alter significantly the[ir] nature.”314 Given 
the participation of United States Attorney’s Offices and district court 
judges, these proceedings are already just as adversarial as criminal 
trials, and defendants deserve similar constitutional rights. Indeed, as 
Gagnon predicted, moving supervised release revocations into district 
courts has placed defendants at a systematic disadvantage, as 
prosecutors and judges are harsher than probation officers and parole 
boards.315 To ensure a fair shot to defendants facing revocation of their 
supervised release, they need more procedural protection than 
parolees. 
V.  THE RIGHT TO A TIMELY REVOCATION HEARING 
Haymond addressed the right to a jury trial, but a full 
understanding of the relationship between parole and supervised 
release should impact many areas of constitutional law. Indeed, the 
 
 309. Id. at 784; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479, 486. 
 310. United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705, 710–11 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 311. Id. 
 312. Judge Posner estimated that each probation officer now supervises thirty-six people. Id. at 
710. 
 313. United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 374 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Petersilia, supra 
note 49, at 483 (“[P]arole has historically provided job assistance, family counseling, and chemical 
dependency programs . . . . But punitive public attitudes, combined with diminishing social service 
resources, have resulted in fewer services provided.”). 
 314. Cf. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787 (explaining that “the introduction of counsel” into a parole 
revocation “will alter significantly the nature of the proceeding”). 
 315. See id. at 787–88. 
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circuit courts have applied parole precedents to deny defendants on 
supervised release myriad constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, 
and Sixth Amendments, as well as the Ex Post Facto Clause and the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.316 In light of the significant differences 
between parole and supervised release outlined above, all these 
decisions should be reconsidered. 
One constitutional protection that is especially important to 
reconsider is the right to a timely revocation hearing. Protection 
against undue delay is among the oldest rights in Anglo-American 
law, dating back to the Magna Carta and enshrined in the Sixth 
Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause.317 It is unique among procedural 
rights in that it not only shields the innocent but also the guilty from 
the “anxiety and concern” of long delay, as well as the “societal 
interest” in efficient justice.318 The right to a timely hearing is 
particularly vital in proceedings to revoke supervised release, because 
the defendant will by definition have at least one prior conviction that 
is a basis for denying him bail.319 Furthermore, “[t]he burden of 
administering [supervised release] is heavy” and revocation 
proceedings are easily brushed off as low scheduling priorities by 
courts and attorneys.320 
Perhaps most importantly, protection against undue delay 
preserves the defendant’s ability to seek “imposition of a concurrent 
sentence” and reduce his total term of imprisonment.321 The typical 
fact pattern arises when a person under supervision is arrested and 
 
 316. See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 442 F.3d 802, 807, 811 (2d Cir. 2006) (Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments); United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 2005) (Sixth Amendment); United 
States v. Armstrong, 187 F.3d 392, 393–94 (4th Cir. 1999) (Fourth Amendment); United States v. 
Frazier, 26 F.3d 110, 114 (11th Cir. 1994) (Federal Rules of Evidence); United States v. Copley, 
978 F.2d 829, 831–32 (4th Cir. 1992) (Fifth Amendment). But see United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 
1117, 1122 (2d Cir. 1994) (Ex Post Facto); United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 
1993) (Ex Post Facto); United States v. Parriett, 974 F.2d 523, 526 n.2 (4th Cir. 1992) (Ex Post 
Facto). 
 317. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223–26 (1967); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 858–59 (July 2004); see U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 318. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519–20, 532–33 (1972). 
 319. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(B) (2012). 
 320. Wooten, supra note 104, at 185; see also Stover, supra note 10, at 196–97. 
 321. Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 733–34 (1985) (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Smith 
v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 378 (1969) (“[T]he possibility that a defendant already in prison might 
receive a sentence at least partially concurrent with the one he is serving may be forever lost if trial 
of the pending charge is postponed.”). 
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charged with a new criminal offense.322 Because committing that 
crime will also violate the conditions of the defendant’s release, the 
probation office will file a petition to revoke his release.323 The 
defendant will then face two parallel proceedings: a criminal 
prosecution for the offense and a revocation proceeding for the 
violation. 
This is where the timing becomes very important. If the defendant 
is sentenced for the offense around the same time that he is sentenced 
for the violation, then he can serve those two sentences concurrently 
with each other and reduce his total time in prison. Typically, 
however, both sides will seek to delay the revocation hearing until 
after the criminal prosecution is complete, because the government 
will want to save resources by using the conviction at trial as automatic 
proof of the violation, and the defendant will not want to present his 
defense for the first time under the lower standard of proof applied to 
revocation.324 
But this is a very dangerous situation for the defendant, because 
any delay after he is sentenced for the offense will deny him the 
opportunity to seek imposition of a concurrent sentence for the 
violation. In other words, he will have to serve his offense sentence 
while waiting for his violation sentence, reducing his available time to 
serve those sentences concurrently. The longer the delay, the more of 
the offense sentence he will serve, and the more of the violation 
sentence he will have to serve consecutively, increasing his total time 
in prison. If the delay lasts long enough, he may complete the sentence 
for the offense and be forced to serve an entirely consecutive sentence 
for the violation, significantly increasing his total term of 
imprisonment. 
 
 322. In “most” revocation cases, “the probationer or parolee has been convicted of committing 
another crime or has admitted the charges against him.” Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 
(1973). 
 323. Every term of supervised release must include a condition that the defendant “not commit 
another Federal, State, or local crime . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2012). The Double Jeopardy Clause 
has been held not to prohibit revocation of release based on conduct that is also charged separately 
as a new criminal offense. See, e.g., United States v. Wyatt, 102 F.3d 241, 245 (7th Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Woodrup, 86 F.3d 359, 363 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Soto-Olivas, 44 F.3d 
788, 789–90 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 324. See United States v. Goodon, 742 F.3d 373, 375–76 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Spraglin, 418 F.3d 479, 481 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Huusko, 275 F.3d 600, 602 (7th Cir. 
2001); see also United States v. Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562, 571 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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Under Speedy Trial Clause precedents, a delay of more than one 
year is presumptively unlawful,325 and delays of four or five years are 
considered “extraordinary.”326 Yet the circuit courts have relied on the 
Supreme Court’s parole precedents to reject challenges to four, five, 
even twelve-year delays of hearings to revoke supervised release, even 
when those delays denied the defendants the chance to seek a 
concurrent sentence.327 These decisions must be reconsidered in light 
of the three differences between parole and supervised release outlined 
above: 
• Because defendants have not been granted early release, 
courts should apply more scrutiny to delayed hearings to 
revoke supervised release. 
• Because there is no rehabilitative justification for delaying 
a hearing to revoke supervised release, courts should 
measure delay from the date of accusation rather than the 
date of custody. 
• Because district courts do not have the same power as the 
Parole Commission to impose retroactively concurrent 
sentences, courts should recognize the harm defendants 
suffer when they are denied the opportunity to seek a 
concurrent sentence. 
 
 325. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992). 
 326. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972). 
 327. See, e.g., United States v. Goode, 700 F. App’x 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (five-year delay); 
United States v. Magnan, 700 F. App’x 838, 840 (10th Cir. 2017) (twelve-year delay); United States 
v. Ivy, 678 F. App’x 369, 372 (6th Cir. 2017) (six-year delay); United States v. Arellano, 645 F. 
App’x 235, 235–36 (4th Cir. 2016) (six-year delay); United States v. Griggs, 507 F. App’x 196, 
200 (3d Cir. 2012) (two-year delay); United States v. Oidac, 486 F. App’x 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(twelve-year delay); United States v. Hicks, 453 F. App’x 940, 942 (11th Cir. 2012) (five-year 
delay); United States v. Magana-Colin, 359 F. App’x 837, 837 (9th Cir. 2009) (three-year delay); 
United States v. Ramos, 401 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2005) (two-year delay); United States v. 
Gomez-Aguilar, 769 F. App’x 412 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, No. 19-6397, 2019 WL 6689793 
(Dec. 9, 2019) (three-year delay); United States v. Sanchez, 225 F.3d 172, 175 (2d Cir. 2000) (four-
year delay); United States v. Throneburg, 87 F.3d 851, 852 (6th Cir. 1996) (two-year delay); United 
States v. Tippens, 39 F.3d 88, 89 (5th Cir. 1994) (two-and-a-half-year delay); United States v. 
Chaklader, 987 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1993) (twenty-one-month delay); United States v. Manson, 
No. 08-CR-877, 2014 WL 2434476 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2014) (five-year delay); United States v. 
Escobar-Izaguirre, No. 2:09 CR 110, 2011 WL 3321304 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 1, 2011) (two-year delay); 
United States v. Herrera-Castellanos, No. 03-1825GT, 2010 WL 4639256 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2010) 
(five-year delay); Allen v. United States, No. 3:04CR017-GHD, 2008 WL 5082119 (N.D. Miss. 
Dec. 2, 2008) (three-year delay); United States v. Cobbs, 436 F. Supp. 2d 860, 861 (E.D. Mich. 
2006) (five-year delay); United States v. Lopez, 985 F. Supp. 59, 60 (D.R.I. 1997) (thirty-two 
month delay). 
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In sum, courts should provide defendants on supervised release 
more protection against delay than parolees by scrutinizing delays 
more carefully, measuring delay from the date of formal accusation, 
and recognizing the prejudice that results from a lost concurrent 
sentence. 
A.  No Early Release Justifying Reduced Constitutional Protection 
Because supervised release is an additional penalty rather than a 
relief from punishment, courts should be less tolerant of delayed 
hearings to revoke supervised release. Although the Supreme Court’s 
narrow reading of the Speedy Trial Clause likely excludes proceedings 
to revoke supervised release,328 defendants are still protected by the 
due process right to a hearing “within a reasonable time.”329 Speedy 
trial precedents are “applicable . . . by analogy,” even if they are not 
“directly controlling.”330 
Though recognizing the right to a timely revocation hearing, the 
circuit courts have so far provided defendants on supervised release 
the same meagre safeguards against delay they afforded to parolees.331 
Speedy Trial Clause precedents recognize “anxiety and concern” as 
sufficient harm to establish a constitutional violation,332 yet the courts 
have held that defendants challenging delayed revocation hearings 
must show prejudice “aside from the anxiety of awaiting . . . 
revocation proceedings.”333 The courts have also permitted extremely 
long delays of revocation hearings that would never pass muster at 
trial.334 These limited protections should be reconsidered, because 
defendants on supervised release have a stronger claim to speedy trial 
rights than parolees, making long delays more unreasonable and more 
stressful. 
At a parole revocation hearing, the hearing body had to decide 
whether to revoke the parolee’s grant of release as part of a failed 
“risk” that he would not engage in further antisocial behavior.335 That 
 
 328. See Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609 (2016); see also Goode, 700 F. App’x at 103; 
Ivy, 678 F. App’x at 372; Oidac, 486 F. App’x at 321; Ramos, 401 F.3d at 115; Tippens, 39 F.3d at 
89 (citing Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976)). 
 329. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972). 
 330. See United States v. Santana, 526 F.3d 1257, 1260, 1262 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 331. See id. at 1261. 
 332. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519–20, 532 (1972). 
 333. Oidac, 486 F. App’x at 322–23; see also Santana, 526 F.3d at 1261. 
 334. See supra note 312. 
 335. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972). 
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risk entitled the government to delay the revocation proceeding in 
order to maximize its available information.336 In fact, deferring the 
revocation hearing arguably helped the parolee by allowing him to 
retain the “benefit” of the release for more time.337 
At a supervised release revocation hearing, by contrast, the court 
is not reviewing a failed “risk,” because the defendant has not been 
granted early release, but instead has served his prison sentence in full, 
followed by a term of supervision in the community. The government 
therefore has less justification for postponing the proceedings. A 
delayed hearing to revoke supervised release also inflicts more 
“anxiety and concern” than a parole revocation, because the defendant 
faces uncertain punishment freshly determined by the district judge, 
rather than a return to prison for the balance of a remaining prison 
term.338 
Although Speedy Trial Clause precedents do not directly control 
revocation of supervised release, they should be treated as more 
persuasive in this context than under parole. Multi-year delays that 
were not previously considered unreasonable should be viewed with 
greater skepticism. Courts should also acknowledge the harm that long 
delay does to defendants on supervised release by causing them 
anxiety and concern about the upcoming proceedings. 
B.  No Rehabilitative Reason for Delaying Hearing 
Because supervised release revocations are more punitive than 
parole revocations, there is less justification for delaying the 
proceedings. Like delayed trials, therefore, delayed hearings to revoke 
supervised release should be measured from the date of official 
accusation. The circuit courts, however, are currently split over how 
to measure delayed hearings to revoke supervised release. Some courts 
measure from the filing of the violation petition, while others measure 
from the date of custody. This issue is outcome determinative in many 
cases,339 reflecting profound disagreement about how to analyze 
 
 336. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 89 (1976). 
 337. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019) 
(No. 17-1672). 
 338. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519–20, 532 (1972). 
 339. For example, imagine a defendant on supervised release who commits a new crime and is 
held in state custody for five years pending resolution of his state case, and only then is finally 
transferred to federal custody for a revocation hearing. Measuring from the date of the violation 
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delayed hearings to revoke release. In recognition of the different 
theories of punishment that animate parole and supervised release 
revocation, courts should resolve this split by measuring delayed 
supervised release revocations from the filing of the violation petition. 
The measurement of delayed hearings to revoke supervised 
release has split the circuit courts. At least two courts officially 
measure delay from the filing of the violation petition, holding that 
like criminal trials, delayed hearings to revoke supervised release 
should be measured from the date of official accusation.340 Several 
other circuit panels, by contrast, have measured from the date of 
custody, holding that, like delayed parole revocations, delayed 
hearings to revoke supervised release should be measured from the 
date the defendant is actually imprisoned for the violation.341 Finally, 
two circuit courts have combined these approaches, holding that delay 
should be measured from the filing of the violation petition with 
respect to prejudice to the defendant’s ability to defend against the 
violation, but from the date of custody with respect to any other kind 
of prejudice.342 
Resolving this circuit split requires reexamining the rehabilitative 
logic of Moody. In that case, the Supreme Court denied the parolee’s 
request for a “prompt” parole revocation hearing by citing the 
“practical” justification that delaying the hearing was essential to its 
rehabilitative function.343 Since the parolee was in prison for a new 
crime and had obviously violated his conditions of release, “the only 
remaining inquiry” at the hearing would be a “prediction” of whether 
 
petition would make the delay five years, while measuring from the date of custody would make 
the delay negligible. See, e.g., United States v. Goode, 700 F. App’x 100 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 340. See United States v. Rasmussen, 881 F.2d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 1989); see also United States 
v. Oidac, 486 F. App’x 318, 321, 322 n.8 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. Pagan-Rodriguez, 600 
F.3d 39, 41–42 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Cockrane, No. 96-4470, 1997 WL 51646, at *1 
(4th Cir. Feb. 10, 1997). 
 341. See United States v. Ivy, 678 F. App’x 369, 373–74 (6th Cir. 2017); see also United States 
v. Arellano, 645 F. App’x 235, 236 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Magana-Colin, 359 F. App’x 
837, 837–38 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Cunningham, 150 F. App’x 994, 996 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 342. See United States v. Ramos, 401 F.3d 111, 115–16 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Tippens, 39 F.3d 88, 90 (5th Cir. 1994). These cases hold that delay between the filing of the 
petition and the hearing is prejudicial only if it “substantially limit[s] the ability to defend against 
the charge that the conditions of supervised release were violated.” Ramos, 401 F.3d at 116; see 
also Tippens, 39 F.3d at 90 (“delay in executing a violator’s warrant” contravenes due process only 
“if the delay undermines his ability to contest the issue of the violation or to proffer mitigating 
evidence”). Aside from this specific kind of prejudice, the defendant has no cause to complain 
about a delayed hearing “until he is taken into custody.” Ramos, 401 F.3d at 115.   
 343. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 81, 89 (1976). 
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he had been cured of his “antisocial” tendencies and was ready to 
return to the community.344 “In making this prophecy,” the Court said, 
“a parolee’s institutional record can be perhaps one of the most 
significant factors.”345 It therefore made sense to delay the hearing 
until the defendant was actually taken into custody on the violation 
warrant, at which point that “prediction [wa]s both most relevant and 
most accurate.”346 
When sentencing a defendant for a supervised release violation, 
by contrast, district judges are forbidden from considering 
rehabilitation.347 Rather, they must “primarily aim[] at sanctioning 
th[e] [defendant’s] breach [of trust]”348 or, “analogously, . . . ‘provide 
just punishment for the offense’ of violating supervised release.”349 
Judges are instructed to focus on “the seriousness of the underling 
violation and the criminal history of the offender,”350 not the 
defendant’s “institutional record.”351 There is therefore no 
rehabilitative justification for delaying the revocation hearing. In fact, 
rather than aid in the revocation decision, delay after the filing of the 
violation petition is likely to reduce the accuracy of the hearing, which 
is aimed at determining a punishment for a past violation, not 
predicting future conduct. 
Because supervised release revocation is a more punitive 
proceeding than parole revocation, Moody’s approach to measuring 
delay does not apply. Instead, delay should be measured from the date 
of the official accusation, which is the filing of the violation petition. 
This approach will not only ensure the accuracy of the hearings, but 
also protect the defendant’s constitutional rights by ensuring that the 
court considers the full extent of the delay. 
 
 344. Id. at 89. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. 
 347. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2012) (“The court, in determining whether to impose a term of 
imprisonment, and, if a term of imprisonment is to be imposed, in determining the length of the 
term, shall consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, 
recognizing that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and 
rehabilitation.”). 
 348. United States v. Phillips, 791 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 349. United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393, 400 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 350. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A3(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). 
 351. Cf. Moody, 429 U.S. at 89 (explaining that the defendant’s “institutional record” is one of 
the most important factors in a parole revocation hearing). 
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C.  No Administrative Flexibility to Impose 
Retroactively Concurrent Sentence 
Because district courts do not have the same power as the Parole 
Commission to impose retroactively concurrent sentences, delay can 
harm a defendant on supervised release by depriving him of the 
opportunity to seek concurrent sentencing. The courts of appeals, 
however, have failed to recognize this harm, confusing the broad 
administrative authority of the Commission with the more limited 
power of district courts. As a result, the courts have wrongly applied 
parole precedents to deny challenges to delayed hearings to revoke 
supervised release, even where those delays denied defendants their 
opportunity to seek concurrent sentences and thereby increased their 
total time in prison. 
The Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Sanchez352 
provides vivid illustration of this unfortunate pattern. The defendant 
in that case was serving a five-year term of supervised release when 
he was arrested by local police and pled guilty to a state drug charge.353 
He served approximately two years in state prison and was released.354 
Over four years later, the federal government sought to revoke his 
supervised release based on the state drug conviction.355 The district 
court revoked his release and sentenced him to another eighteen 
months imprisonment.356 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the four-year delay violated 
his right to a revocation hearing within a reasonable time, because it 
cost him the chance to seek a sentence for the violation that would run 
concurrently to his state prison term.357 The Second Circuit rejected 
this argument, noting that under “Moody . . . [the defendant] was not 
prejudiced by the delay because the district court had the power to 
grant the equivalent of a concurrent sentence retroactively for [the 
defendant’s] violation of supervised release.”358 Multiple other courts 
of appeals have since applied this same reasoning to hold that 
 
 352. 225 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 353. Id. at 174. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. at 175. 
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. 
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defendants are not prejudiced by delayed hearings to revoke 
supervised release.359 
These decisions are demonstrably wrong, however, because 
district courts do not have the same power as the Parole Commission 
to impose retroactively concurrent sentences. Under the parole 
regulations, the Commission was empowered to credit a parolee for 
any time served on criminal conduct underlying a parole violation.360 
Thus, as the Supreme Court said in Moody, the Commission could 
“grant, retroactively, the equivalent of concurrent sentences.”361 As a 
result, a delayed parole revocation could not harm a parolee by 
denying him the chance to seek a concurrent sentence, because the 
Parole Commission could always grant the parolee credit toward the 
violation sentence for the time he had already served on the underlying 
offense.362 
District courts, by contrast, have no authority to impose 
retroactively concurrent sentences. Instead, federal law mandates that 
“[a] sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the 
defendant is received . . . at, the official detention facility at which the 
sentence is to be served.”363 Courts may not “award credit at 
sentencing” for time served,364 nor may they impose a sentence 
 
 359. See United States v. Goode, 700 F. App’x 100, 104 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[T]he District Court 
certainly could have ordered . . . that [the defendant’s] federal sentence for violating supervised 
release run retroactively concurrently with his state sentence.”); United States v. Tippens, 39 F.3d 
88, 90 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[The defendant] has not been prejudiced by the delay. It did not impair his 
ability to contest the revocation. And, the district court had the ability ‘to grant, retroactively, the 
equivalent of concurrent sentences.’” (quoting Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 87 (1976))); United 
States v. Chaklader, 987 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[T]he passage of twenty-one months in no 
way restricted the court’s ability ‘to grant, retroactively, the equivalent of concurrent sentences.’” 
(quoting Moody, 429 U.S. at 87)); see also United States v. Garrett, 253 F.3d 443, 447–48 (9th Cir. 
2001) (“The Court in Moody unambiguously held that the federal government is not constitutionally 
required to writ a defendant out of state custody and into federal custody for purposes of executing 
a violation warrant. Furthermore, the opinion clarifies that a defendant cannot claim prejudice from 
such a delay on the ground that he is unable to serve his multiple sentences concurrently.”); United 
States v. Escobar-Izaguirre, No. 2:09-CR 110, 2011 WL 3321304, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 1, 2011); 
United States v. Lopez, 985 F. Supp. 59, 64–65 (D.R.I. 1997). 
 360. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.21(b)(1)–(2) (1976) (“If a finding is made that the prisoner has engaged 
in behavior constituting new criminal conduct . . . [t]ime served on a new state or federal sentence 
shall be credited as time in custody.”). 
 361. Moody, 429 U.S. at 87–88 (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.21, 2.52(c)(2) (1976)). 
 362. See id. at 87. 
 363. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) (2012); see also United States v. Flores, 616 F.2d 840, 841 (5th Cir. 
1980) (“[A] federal sentence cannot commence prior to the date it is pronounced, even if made 
concurrent with a sentence already being served.”). 
 364. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333–34 (1992); see also United States v. Gonzalez, 
192 F.3d 350, 355 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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concurrent with one the defendant has already completed.365 At best, 
a judge can recommend to the Bureau of Prisons that the defendant 
receive credit for time served on another prison term,366 but that 
recommendation is not binding and the Bureau has the final say.367 
The Sentencing Guidelines, moreover, recommend that revocation 
sentences run consecutively to other prison sentences, even if they are 
based on the same conduct.368 
Because district courts do not have the same power as the Parole 
Commission to impose retroactively concurrent sentences, Moody 
does not apply to defendants on supervised release. Instead, a delayed 
hearing to revoke supervised release can inflict substantial harm on a 
defendant by denying him the chance to seek a concurrent sentence 
and forcing him to serve his violation sentence consecutively to the 
offense sentence, thereby extending his total time in prison. A longer 
prison term is a vivid form of unconstitutional prejudice and deserves 
recognition when courts review challenges to delayed hearings to 
revoke supervised release. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The replacement of parole with supervised release transformed 
federal community supervision in dramatic ways that should be 
reflected in constitutional law. Although the circuit courts regard them 
as “constitutionally indistinguishable,”369 there are actually three key 
differences between parole and supervised release: their method of 
 
 365. See United States v. Lucas, 745 F.3d 626, 629 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Nothing . . . authorizes the 
district court to extend the benefit of a concurrent sentence to . . . those who have previously served 
sentences, now completed, for related crimes.”); United States v. Fay, 547 F.3d 1231, 1236 (10th 
Cir. 2008) (“A district court . . . does not have the authority to impose a sentence to be served 
concurrently with a discharged sentence.”); United States v. Labeille-Soto, 163 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 
1998) (“There is no provision . . . stating that the court may order that the sentence it imposes be 
deemed to have been served concurrently with a prior prison term that has been fully discharged.”). 
 366. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2012); see also Rogers v. United States, 180 F.3d 349, 356–58 
(9th Cir. 1999); McCarthy v. Doe, 146 F.3d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 1998); Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 
476, 477–78 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 367. See Taylor v. Sawyer, 284 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. 
Pineyro, 112 F.3d 43, 45–46 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The district court’s recommendation was not binding 
on BOP, as we have explained.”). A truly determined judge might attempt to achieve the same 
effect as a retroactively concurrent sentence by imposing a shorter prison term, see United States 
v. Dorsey, 166 F.3d 558, 560 (3d Cir. 1999), but that would require a downward variance from the 
range recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines. 
 368. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7B1.3(f) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018); 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7B1.4(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
 369. United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 985 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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imposition (relief/penalty), their theory of punishment 
(rehabilitative/punitive), and their governing institutions 
(agency/courts). 
These differences change how the Constitution applies to each 
system, calling into question numerous circuit court decisions 
applying parole precedents to supervised release. The Supreme 
Court’s parole revocation decisions depended on parole’s unique 
nature as an administrative process aimed at rehabilitating prisoners 
by granting them early release. Those decisions do not apply to 
supervised release, which instead is a judicial sentence imposed to 
punish defendants beyond their original prison terms. 
Supervised released is truly a “unique” form of post-release 
supervision,370 a significant feature of the federal justice system that 
impacts nearly every criminal defendant and is responsible for the 
incarceration of tens of thousands. It requires a fresh constitutional 
analysis, based on its distinctive qualities, to ensure that mass 
supervision does not overtake the “ancient protections” of the Bill of 
Rights.371 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 370. Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 407–08 (1991). 
 371. See United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2382 (2019). 
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